Water safety plans - Book 1: Planning water safety management for urban piped water supplies in developing countries by Sam Godfrey (7181705) & Guy Howard (4117807)
iWater Safety Plans: Book 1
Planning Water Safety Management for 
Urban Piped Water Supplies 
in Developing Countries
ii
iii
Sam Godfrey & Guy Howard
Planning Water Safety Management for 
Urban Piped Water Supplies 
in Developing Countries
Water, Engineering and Development Centre
Loughborough University
2005
Water Safety Plans: Book 1
iv
Water, Engineering and Development Centre 
Loughborough University
Leicestershire
LE11 3TU  UK
© WEDC, Loughborough University, 2005
Any part of this publication, including the illustrations (except items taken 
from other publications where the authors do not hold copyright) may be copied, 
reproduced or adapted to meet local needs, without permission from the author/s 
or publisher, provided the parts reproduced are distributed free, or at cost and 
not for commercial ends, and the source is fully acknowledged as given below. 
Please send copies of any materials in which text or illustrations have been used to 
WEDC Publications at the address given above.
A reference copy of this publication is also available online at: 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/wedc/publications/index.htm
Godfrey, S. and Howard, G., (2005)
Water Safety Plans: Book 1
Planning Water Safety Management for  
Urban Piped Water Supplies in Developing Countries
WEDC, Loughborough University, UK.
ISBN Paperback 1 84380 052 7
This document is an output from a project funded by the UK  
Department for International Development (DFID)  
for the benefit of low-income countries.  
The views expressed are not necessarily those of DFID.
Designed and produced at WEDC 
vSam Godfrey (sgodfrey@unicef.org) is currently working 
as a Water and Environmental Sanitation Project Officer and 
Technical Resource Officer for water quality with UNICEF in 
Bhopal, Madhya Pradeshk, India. He is a Chartered Water and 
Environmental Manager with experience of risk assessment 
and management of both piped water supplies and groundwater 
in 15 countries in Africa, Asia and South America. He works 
for WEDC (the Water, Engineering and Development Centre), 
Loughborough University, UK where he has spent much of the 
last three years in Uganda and India researching appropriate risk 
assessment and management plans, which led to the production 
of these guidelines.
Dr Guy Howard (guyhoward@agni.com) is a DFID 
Infrastructure and Urban Development Advisor (from August 
2003) and was previously a Programme Manager at WEDC, 
Loughborough University and Research Fellow at the Robens 
Centre for Public and Environmental Health, University of 
Surrey. He is a member of the Drinking Water Committee that 
oversees the revision of the WHO Guidelines for Drinking-
Water Quality and is a co-author of the book Water Safety Plans: 
Managing drinking-water quality from catchment to consumer, 
which is the principal substantiation document on water safety 
plans for the WHO Guidelines.
About the authors
vi
Acknowledgements
The financial support of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) is gratefully 
acknowledged. The authors would also like to thank those who have contributed to the development 
of these guidelines.
Uganda
Sarah Tibatemwa, Chief Analyst, National Water & Sewerage Corporation (NWSC), Kampala
Charles Niwagaba, Department of Civil Engineering, Makerere University, Kampala
Frank Kizito, Geographical Information Section (GIS), NWSC, Kampala
Christopher Kanyesigye, Quality Control Manager, NWSC, Kampala
Alex Gisagara, Planning and Development Manager, NWSC, Kampala
Godfrey Arwata, Microbiologist, NWSC, Kampala,
Sekayizzi Andrew, Area Manager, NWSC, Jinja
Lillian Nabasirye, Area Engineer, NWSC, Jinja
India
Prem Chand, Md. Amwar, Venkateswara Rao, Rama Kumar 
 KAKTOS Consult, Hydrabad
Srinivas Chary, Administrative Staffing College of India (ASCI), Hydrabad
N.V.R.K. Prasada Rao, District Engineer, GMC, Guntur
United Kingdom and Europe
Professor Trudy Harpham and Dr Roger Few, South Bank University, London, UK
Dr Lorna Fewtrell, Centre for Research into Environment and Health, Wales
Dr Steve Pedley and Kali Johal, Robens, University of Surrey, UK
Oliver Schmoll, German Environment Agency, Germany
Dr Sam Kayaga and Kevin Sansom, WEDC, UK
Dr Margaret Ince, Consultant, UK
Finally, the authors wish to acknowledge Dr Kala Vairavamoorthy (WEDC) for his intellectual 
input and Sue Plummer and Karen Betts of the WEDC Publications Office.
vii
Who should read this book
This book has been written specifically for practitioners involved in the operation, 
maintenance and management of piped water supplies in urban areas in developing 
countries.
These practitioners include engineers, water quality analysts, planners, managers, 
sociologists and water professionals involved in the monitoring and control of 
water safety in piped water supplies. The book is designed to provide guidance to 
operators of piped water supplies in urban areas on how to develop effective risk 
management plans, known as Water Safety Plans (WSPs). It is written exclusively 
to enable water suppliers to develop WSPs without having to depend heavily on 
specialized external input.
viii
How to use this book
The book is designed to guide the user through the process of developing Water 
Safety Plans. It provides a simple step by step approach to developing WSPs for 
operators and managers of piped water supplies. At each stage, the principles 
of the stage are outlined as well as methods and tools required to achieve these 
principles. Each section ends with a summary of key competencies achieved from 
each stage.
ix
How does this book fit into the 
overall guidelines?
This book is Document 1 in the guidelines series developed for Project KaR R8029, 
Improved Risk Assessment and Management for Piped Urban Water Supplies. It 
provides guidance on the practical aspects of water quality management in piped 
water supplies and outlines specifi c aspects of how to develop Water Safety Plans 
(WSP).
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1PLANNING WATER SAFETY MANAGEMENT
Chapter 1
Introduction
The delivery of safe drinking-water is vital for protecting public health and 
promoting more secure livelihoods in urban areas. Very often, however, assessment 
of water safety is limited to occasional tests of water quality and insuffi cient 
attention is paid to the proactive management of water safety.
To ensure the delivery of safe drinking-water, it is important that water safety 
objectives are established. These should take into account exposures and risk in 
order to make informed and balanced judgments about the levels of health protection 
required. Bartram et al. (2001), note that this process is cyclical, as shown in 
HEALTH
TARGETS
Assessment 
of risk
Risk
management
PUBLIC
HEALTH
STATUS
Assess 
environmental 
exposure
Acceptable risk
Figure 1.1. A simplified framework (Bartram et al., 2001)
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Figure 1.1. In the revision of their Guidelines for Drinking-Water Quality the World 
Health Organization (WHO) identified five key components that are required to 
deliver safe drinking-water (WHO, 2004; Davison et al., 2004):
1. The establishment of health-based targets for microbial and chemical quality 
of water
2. A system assessment to determine whether the water supply chain from 
catchment to consumer can deliver safe drinking-water at the point of 
consumption
3. Monitoring of identified control measures within the water supply chain that 
provide assurance of safety
4. Management plans documenting the system assessment and monitoring and 
which describe the actions to be taken during normal operation and incident 
conditions to secure water safety
5. Independent public health surveillance of water safety
Steps 2 to 4 inclusive constitute what is called a Water Safety Plan (WSP). It is 
usually the responsibility of the water supplier to prepare, implement and evaluate 
the WSP. The establishment of health-based targets and surveillance are more 
typically the responsibility of the health sector (Havelaar et al., 2003; Howard, 
2002; WHO, 1997; WHO, 2004).
This book is designed to help those staff in water supply agencies who are 
responsible for providing water through piped water systems to develop WSPs. 
The evidence presented, is the result of a three year Department for International 
Development (DFID) funded Knowledge and Research (KaR) project Contract 
No. R8029, Improved risk assessment and management of piped urban water 
supplies. Field research was undertaken in three project sites, Kampala and Jinja 
in Uganda and Guntur in Andrapradesh, India.
Extracts from each of these case studies are outlined in Annexe 2. Full details 
of the books can be obtained from WEDC, Loughborough University, UK or 
electronically at http://wedc.lboro.ac.uk/publications/index.htm
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Why do we need WSPs?
The traditional approach to water quality and safety management has relied on the 
testing of drinking-water. This takes place as it leaves the treatment works or at 
selected points, either within the distribution system or at consumer taps. This is 
known as ‘end-product testing’. The problem with this approach is that the results 
are too little and too late for preventative action. Figure 1.2 illustrates the intrinsic 
linkages between positive or negative testing of water quality, water collection 
and water-related health burdens.
Too little because so few samples are taken compared to the amount of water 
produced. Therefore, conclusions drawn about the safety of the water from the 
results of such sampling are inevitably compromised, particularly for microbial 
quality and in systems with a high throughput of water. Research has also shown 
that pathogens may be found when the commonly used indicator bacteria are not 
present and diseases can still be transmitted by water that meets standards for 
indicator bacteria (Payment, 1998, Medema, 2003).
Too late because usually by the time the results are available, the water has been 
supplied and may have been consumed and therefore preventive action is no longer 
possible. This is a particular problem in relation to microbial quality, where most 
tests provide quantitative results only after several hours of incubation.
Figure 1.2. Conventional approaches to Water Quality Monitoring
4WATER SAFETY PLANS: BOOK 1
Quality assurance
To improve the management of water safety, the use of quality assurance procedures 
is increasingly promoted (Deere et al., 2001, Davison et al., 2004, WHO, 2004). 
These quality assurance procedures have the advantage over end-product testing 
in that they ensure that the processes involved in delivering safe drinking-water 
are operated properly and under full control at all times. As these processes are 
designed to reduce, eliminate or prevent contamination of the water supply, when 
they are under control, so is the risk of contamination. When such approaches are 
adopted, monitoring can focus on simple, measured parameters. These rapidly 
identify where control is compromised, enabling action to be taken immediately 
to bring the system back into control before any contaminated water is distributed 
and consumed.
Quality assurance has been practised for many years in the water sector through 
the:
• multiple barrier principle in water supply design;
• documentation of operating procedures; and
• use of regular monitoring of key operational parameters such as chlorine 
residuals and turbidity.
Figure 1.3 outlines a conventional multiple barrier configuration showing raw 
water abstraction from a river, to water treatment, water storage, water distribution 
through pipes/valves and water collection at standpipes.
Some Northern water suppliers have applied formal quality assurance schemes such 
as those based on ISO 9000 and the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points 
(HACCP) scheme used in the food industry (Dillon, 1996). HACCP in particular 
has proved to be a valuable tool in ensuring the delivery of safe drinking-water 
and has been applied by a number of utility water supplies and within national 
risk management frameworks in Europe, the United States, Australia and New 
Zealand.
WSPs use many of the components of HACCP, but also elements of other 
approaches such as those within ISO 9000 and the concepts of total quality 
management (TQM). Although the use of a WSP provides greater assurance of 
quality and supports more effective asset management, they have not yet been 
widely applied in developing countries. One of the reasons for this is that ‘crisis 
management’ is the norm with many water suppliers in developing countries.
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Figure 1.3. Failures in the multiple barrier approach
What is a Water Safety Plan?
A WSP is an improved risk management tool designed to ensure the delivery of 
safe drinking-water. It identifies:
• the hazards that the water supply is exposed to and the level of risk associated 
with each;
• how each hazard will be controlled;
• how the means of control will be monitored;
• how the operator can tell if control has been lost;
• what actions are required to restore control; and
• how the effectiveness of the whole system can be verified.
By developing a WSP, the system managers and operators will gain a thorough 
understanding of their system and the risks that must be managed. This knowledge 
can then be used to develop operational plans and identify key priorities for action. 
The development of a WSP will also identify what additional training and capacity-
building initiatives are required to support and improve the performance of the 
water supplier in meeting water safety targets.
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How to develop a Water Safety Plan
The development of a Water Safety Plan involves:
• preventing contamination of source waters;
• treating water to reduce or remove contamination in order that water safety 
targets are met; and
• preventing re-contamination during storage, distribution and handling of 
water.
In order to do this, the water supplier needs to:
• assemble a team that understands the system and its ability to meet the water 
quality targets;
• identify where contamination could arise within the water supply, and how it 
could be controlled;
• validate the methods employed to control hazards;
• establish both a monitoring system to check that safe water is consistently 
supplied and agreed corrective actions in the case of deviation outside acceptable 
limits; and
• periodically verify that the Water Safety Plan is being implemented correctly 
and is achieving the performance required to meet the water safety targets.
To establish a WSP, a number of steps are required. There are some essential 
prerequisites, such as getting commitment from managers and relevant planning 
activities. Once this commitment has been gained, the WSP steering group is formed, 
the water supply system described, field assessments of the supply undertaken and 
then system-specific WSP matrices developed that can be periodically improved 
and verified using selected microbial parameters.
Figure 1.4 outlines the main steps in developing a WSP, all of which are described 
in this book.
This project developed at the same time that the WHO Guidelines for Drinking-
Water Quality (GDWQ) Edition 3 was being revised. Water Safety Plans by 
Davison et al. (2004) is a critical supporting document to the development of the 
WHO GDWQ 2004. This book has some similarities in approach to the methods 
of developing a WSP outlined in that book. However, this book describes findings 
from developing and implementing WSPs in developing countries. The approaches 
required are different for the following selected reasons:
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Figure 1.4. Development of a WSP (Davison et al., 2004)
Assemble team
Describe water supply
Conduct hazard analysis
Define operational limits
Establish monitoring
Establish corrective actions 
and incident response
Establish record keeping
Validation and verification
Identify control measures
Management
and
communication
Operational
monitoring
System
assessment
Supporting
programmes
Review, approval
and audit
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needs
1. Limited data availability – many systems in the developing world are only 
recently developing the culture of data collection and storage.
2. Unplanned development – limited regulation has resulted in unplanned 
development making it diffi cult to locate all supply mains.
3. Sanitation – poor access to urban sanitation means potential cross contamination 
of water pipes is common.
4. System knowledge – much of the information on the piped networks may not be 
available as records may have been removed by contractors, colonial powers.
5. Equipment/human resource availability – selection of appropriate water quality 
parameters should consider availability of resources.
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Because of these factors, this project developed a more concise approach to 
developing WSPs for developing countries. The principles remain the same as those 
outlined in Davison et al. (2004) but include specific refinements and different 
terminology. For example, in Uganda significant time was spent in locating the 
pipelines during a desk-based system analysis stage before any form of system 
assessment could be undertaken. Because up-to-date network maps are rarely 
available, the system analysis may involve heavy reliance on expert judgement 
(i.e. local knowledge).
Figure 1.5 outlines the key steps required when developing WSPs in developing 
countries.
Commitment from managers and operational staff
Before the process of developing the WSP, it is imperative that all members of 
the water supplier agree on the benefits. Technical staff need a commitment to the 
WSP approach from all management levels, from field managers to the managing 
director. This section outlines examples of appropriate ways to achieve this 
agreement from the different groups and emphasizes the importance of obtaining 
commitment from all levels of staff. It further highlights that different tools and 
approaches are recommended for different groups of staff. The section is divided 
into management commitment and operational commitment.
For successful implementation of the WSP, it is important that senior management 
buy into the process. This process is crucial to obtain support for changes in working 
practices and to actively promote water safety as a goal of the organization.
It is key to obtain a commitment from senior management so that clear and 
coherent arguments can be presented which explain why the adoption of a WSP 
is necessary and advantageous to the organisation, and why a WSP is preferable 
to other approaches. Therefore, it is important to outline:
• what is being done now;
• where the organization wants to be in the future; and,
• how the organization aims to get there.
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Figure 1.5. Developing WSPs in developing countries
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Figure 1.6. Engaging senior management in the WSP process
(Re)Presentation to board 
of directors of advantages 
of WSPs
Accept
Technical/financial 
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to operators/financial 
managers
Participatory workshop to 
define roles and 
responsibilities
Re-formulate 
arguements to meet 
requirements of senior 
management
Begin WSP preparation
?
Reject
Figure 1.6 outlines some suggested ways to engage senior management in the WSP 
process. The strategy to obtain management commitment to the WSP process must 
fit within a broader planning process. This should consider the wider financial 
and resource implications of undertaking a WSP instead of conventional water 
quality monitoring. Central to this is the process of emphasizing in non-scientific 
terms the advantages of WSPs (such as cost savings and appropriateness of quality 
assurance approaches rather than quality control). For example, it was estimated 
that the Ugandan National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) saved 30 
per cent in their total budget for water quality control by implementing a WSP 
instead of conventional water quality monitoring (Howard, in press).
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Management commitment
The first stage in achieving management commitment to the WSP process is to 
prepare a short briefing note or proposal on the WSP approach. This may include 
the WSP benefits, what current activities undertaken by the utility are consistent 
with the WSP approach, what new working practices may be required and what 
will be the expected impacts on cost.
During the initial meeting with utility board of directors and operations managers, 
it is important to present the briefing note to the senior management team. In this 
presentation, emphasis should be placed on why the WSP approach is appropriate. 
The actual approach adopted will vary according to the specific environment 
within which the water supplier is operating. Different aspects of the WSP will 
be attractive to managers in different circumstances. A range of possible key entry 
points are noted below:
• WSPs are cutting-edge approaches that demonstrate to the public, health bodies 
and regulators that the water supplier is applying best practice to secure water 
safety;
• Quality assurance can secure water safety;
• There are limitations to relying on end-product testing as a means of water 
safety control;
• There is potential for savings with the WSP approach;
• There is potential to market services to new and existing consumers of an 
improved product.
The briefing should also outline how the WSP could be implemented, for instance, 
by proposing a pilot project be initiated on one supply as a means of demonstrating 
the feasibility of the WSP approach. This will probably include running the pilot 
project alongside existing water quality management as a means of evaluating 
WSP feasibility. This approach may gain greater acceptance as it does not imply 
an immediate change to a WSP and will provide senior managers with evidence 
from their own supplies to review before committing to a change in operating 
practice.
The further technical, scientific and financial advantages of the WSP can be 
presented in full once an initial consultation has been undertaken. An example of 
the format that this presentation could take is outlined in Box 1.1.
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The key output needed from the senior management meeting and briefing note is 
approval for the implementation of a WSP pilot project and a commitment that the 
outcomes of this pilot will determine whether full-scale adoption of the WSP will 
occur. This is the approach that was followed in Uganda (Godfrey et al., 2004). It 
allowed the water quality control department to make a case at each stage of WSP 
development for further activities and resulted in WSP definition being included 
in work plans.
Operational commitment
A WSP can only be successfully introduced if there is commitment from operational 
staff. So, the in-house promotion of WSPs is vital. The job descriptions of water 
treatment plant operators, plumbers, water quality monitors and analysts vary 
greatly. In some small systems one or two individuals are responsible for all 
of these tasks, whereas, in larger systems a team of ten or more people may be 
responsible for each of the jobs.
It is important to ensure that this commitment is developed in parallel with the 
development of the WSP itself. A meeting needs to be held with staff to present 
and discuss WSPs in relation to existing practice and to review the features of 
WSPs that make it a more effective way of ensuring water safety.
One important aspect of this process is to show the interlinkages between the 
role of the different job descriptions. This must be explained in language that is 
understandable at a local level. The use of decision trees such as those described 
in Box 1.2 can help to explain the interlinkages.
Box 1.1. Management buy in  
– NWSC Kampala, Uganda
An initial briefing meeting was held in the NWSC Kampala headquarters with NWSC’s 
Managing Director, senior managers, engineers and accountants as well as, analysts 
from the Water Quality Control Department, and operators from both the water 
distribution and sewer networks.
A presentation was given by technical staff and covered the following topics:
1. Current water quality monitoring practise
2. Weaknesses in end-product testing in comparison to the Water Safety Plan (WSP) 
approach
3. How to establish WSPs
4. Advantages/disadvantages of the WSP approach (financial, technical)
5. The benefits of piloting the WSP approach.
13
PLANNING WATER SAFETY MANAGEMENT
Box 1.2. WSP interlinkages
Example
The service reservoir attendant records a decrease in flow into the service reservoir 
and so contacts the distribution engineer to check if any leaks have developed in the 
network. A leak is identified at a valve on the transmission main and a maintenance 
team is called out to fix the leaking valve box. Whilst fixing the leaking valve, they 
realise that they do not have the recommended Teflon tape. Instead plastic is wrapped 
around the pipe that connects to the valve. The following day, the water quality analyst 
notes deterioration in microbial quality because there is both no free chlorine and 
an increase in turbidity and so conducts a sanitary inspection which identifies the 
problem. The analyst immediately informs the operations department and initiates 
action. The analyst takes a sample for microbial analysis, which shows that because 
he acted promptly, the risk to public health was greatly reduced.
System upgrade
?NO
?
Leak identified and fixed 
using correct materials
Sanitary compliance?
Take water sample
Is the sample 
microbiologically safe
Safe water
Decrease in flow to 
service reservoir
YES
YES
NO
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The example in Box 1.2 shows that if the analyst had relied solely on the results 
of the microbiological analysis before taking action there would have been a 
greater risk to public health; ongoing contamination would have occurred. Box 1.2 
also stresses the importance of the interlinkages between the roles of different 
operations staff. For the WSP approach to function, clear job descriptions on 
roles and responsibilities for each staff member should be established. In many 
cases, the roles will not vary considerably from existing practices. For example, 
the only variation may be in the level of detailed reporting required and type of 
data collected and disseminated by each section.
When initiating discussions with operational staff to obtain their commitment to 
WSPs, it is important to discuss fully and frankly the concerns they may have 
about changes in working practices. It is important to emphasize that in many 
situations, actual working practices change very little under a WSP. Consequently, 
tasks already undertaken as part of routine activity may become more formal.
How is a WSP different?
WSPs will increase the amount of time staff spend in the field inspecting the system 
and undertaking physio-chemical analysis and reduce reliance on analysing samples 
of water for micro-organisms in a laboratory, as shown in Box 1.3. Crucially, 
the WSP enables the operators to get to know their system more effectively as 
they spend more time identifying and controlling risks rather than just analysing 
them.
Planning
Once there is agreement that the WSP approach will be piloted, it is important 
to develop a plan of activity and to identify which organizations and staff will 
undertake particular roles within the WSP.
Undertaking an organizational and institutional review
In many cases, it will be useful to review the current organizational and institutional 
structure of the water supplier and other sector stakeholders in order to establish 
which organizations have an interest in and/or responsibility for water safety. These 
should be undertaken in two stages to deal with both the internal and external 
environments. The internal environment is the operating environment of the water 
supplier and the external environment is the other organizations or groups and 
consumers involved or interested in water safety.
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The fi rst stage in this process is to prepare a list of all the departments within the 
water supplier. Each department should be asked to identify what their role is 
with regard to water safety, the number of staff in their department, the level and 
nature of work carried out, the position of the head in relation to management and 
the head of department’s infl uence over decisions regarding water safety. Then an 
activity-responsibility matrix can be developed and roles within the WSP can be 
allocated to the different departments and units.
A review should also be undertaken of the roles, responsibilities and interests in 
water safety of external stakeholders. This review should address statutory roles, 
all aspects of regulation (fi nancial, safety, environment), involvement in capital 
and operational investment in specifi c circumstances (for instance epidemics), and 
interest groups. For each stakeholder, the relative infl uence each has over policy, 
investment, regulation and operations should be noted as a means of identifying 
how each stakeholder interacts with the supplier. It is important to note that in 
undertaking this exercise, all stakeholders should be identifi ed and not only those 
who are of power or infl uence. For instance, consumers may not be powerful, but 
they are the most important stakeholders.
Once the stakeholder analysis has been completed, an activity-responsibility 
matrix for the sector stakeholders can be developed as a means of understanding 
the institutional environment within which water safety operates. This will help 
guide the subsequent implementation of the WSP.
Box 1.3. Advantages of WSPs
Reliance on 
microbial laboratory
Reliance on 
field sanitary inspection, 
physico-chemical testing
D
ec
re
as
e
Increase
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Planning activities
It is recommended that a transparent management plan for the implementation 
of the WSP is designed. To aid this process, GANTT charts or other methods of 
project-line management may be used in the initial project planning stage (see 
Box 1.4). DFID’s Guidance Manual for Water Supply and Sanitation Programmes 
(1998) provides a useful reference for management models.
When designing the GANTT chart, it is important to calculate the number of person 
days required for the principal activities needed to implement the WSP. It should 
be stressed that there is no standard for the number of days required to undertake 
each activity or a standard number of times each activity is required. Both of 
these decisions are specific to the water supply. For example, undertaking the field 
assessment of a large water distribution system of more than 800km of pipeline 
in Kampala took 40 person days, while the assessment of a smaller network in 
Guntur of 600km took 15 days.
The final activity is a verification exercise using selected microbial parameters. It 
is recommended that this is undertaken once the WSP has been developed for the 
individual supply. In the context of this research, the exercise required 5 person days 
in the Guntur supply and 20 working days in the Kampala supply. Subsequently a 
rolling programme of verification testing should be established once the WSP is 
operational in order to test the effectiveness of the plan in improving water safety 
within the supply.
Outlined in the following sections are details of the major steps in establishing 
the WSP. They follow the seven major stages developed during this research for 
effective implementation of WSPs in developing countries and conclude with 
principles on how to implement the WSP once completed.
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A steering group should be set up to guide the process of implementing a WSP. It 
is recommended that this is composed of members from varied professional back-
grounds in order to form a balanced interdisciplinary team. As well as engineers 
and water quality managers, the steering group may include academics, planners, 
surveyors, sociologists and health scientists. The balance of varied professionals 
is important to ensure that the water safety plan incorporates financial, technical 
and social considerations.
During the process of forming the WSP steering group, it is important to identify 
a risk manager. The risk manager has overall responsibility for establishing the 
WSP.
Figure 2.1. Forming a WSP steering group
Reject
Undertake 
activity/responsibility 
matrix exercise
Arrange meeting with identified 
managers, engineers, academics, 
surveyors, sociologists and 
scientists 
WSP steering group formed
?Accept
Identify other 
team members
Utility to identify appropriate 
members of WSP steering group 
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In allocating specific tasks in the preparation and implementation of the WSP, an 
activity-responsibility matrix should be used to assign specific responsibilities to 
individual members of the task force. Box 2.2 outlines how this can be done for 
two important activities in setting up WSPs; the system assessment and the water 
quality assessment.
Box 2.1. Forming a WSP steering group in Kampala
In Kampala, the WSP steering group was formed during initial discussions with the 
senior management of NWSC. Members of the team were selected on the basis of 
their professional ability as well as the extent of their involvement in water safety 
related activities. Most people volunteered to be members of the team during a 
consultation meeting with the Managing Director of the National Water and Sewerage 
Corporation (NWSC). These volunteers were from NWSC and academia (Public Health 
and Environmental Engineering Laboratory of Makerere University). 
As NWSC are responsible for water quality, the team was co-ordinated by the NWSC 
WQCD. The Principal Analyst of NWSC WQCD was appointed as the risk manager.
Box 2.2. Activity/responsibility matrix
Activity/
responsibility Task force members
Principle 
water 
quality 
analysis
Senior 
engineers
Chief  
engineer
Operations 
manager
Quality 
control 
manager
Health  
department
System
assessment I R A A A A
Water quality 
assessment R I A I A A
Where
I = Involved   R = Responsible   A = Aware
It is important to divide responsibilities amongst the stakeholders during the as-
sessment stage. This division must receive full approval from senior managers. 
This is achieved by ensuring that the core of the WSP steering group are middle 
and/or senior managers. These staff should have a broad understanding of the use 
of a WSP as a means of improving water quality in their water supply.
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In developing the WSP, it is essential to ensure that the members of the team have 
a good understanding of how the water supply is designed and operated, and the 
nature of the people that are served by the supply. The first stage is therefore to 
develop a description of the system, which may be supported by a basic flow 
diagram for the supply. Next, the intended use of the water and vulnerability level 
assessment of the varied end-user groups should be defined.
The description of the water supply should include the:
• source of water and catchment (for instance capacity of the source in relation 
to demand, protection measures applied, developments in the catchment that 
may affect quality, known water quality problems)
• treatment processes applied (providing information about configurations, 
numbers of individual units, age of plant, known design faults)
• storage within the distribution systems (how many service reservoirs, their 
volume, areas that they serve, age, known design problems)
• distribution system (limit of responsibility of utility, extent, population served, 
known problems); and,
• consideration of re-contamination in household distribution and/or storage
An example of an overview water supply description from Guntur, India is outlined 
in Box 3.1.
Box 3.1. Water supply description – Guntur, India
The Guntur system is fed from surface water extracted from the river Krishna. It has two 
treatment works using conventional treatment unit processes (coagulation/flocculation/
sedimentation/chlorination). The combined capacity of the works is 75,000m3 per 
day which is then distributed to service reservoirs. The Guntur Municipal Corporation 
(operators of the network) supplies 66,363m3 per day from the service reservoirs 
through 21 elevated tanks and 10 ground level tanks. The city is divided into 10 zones 
and the water is distributed through 600km of pipeline.
Describing the catchment and treatment processes should be relatively easy as data 
is known or can be readily acquired. When undertaking the preliminary system 
analysis, it is worth reviewing the data available to evaluate the likely source-
water contaminant loads. For treatment processes, the literature can be consulted 
to identify expected log reductions through individual treatment processes. This 
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can be used as a guide to whether these will provide sufficient removal in relation 
to expected source-water loads. One good source of information is a review by 
LeChevallier and Au (2003). Where there is very little data on source water quality, 
use the estimates of source water contamination provided in the WHO Guidelines 
for Drinking-Water Quality (WHO, 2004).
At this stage, it is also useful to prepare a diagram showing the flow of water 
through the treatment works, identifying each unit process and the location of 
principal inlets, flow control valves and dosing pumps as well as valves, back-
washing tanks, etc. Box 3.2 outlines an example of the treatment configuration in 
Kampala, Uganda.
This configuration gives a breakdown of the main treatment unit processes and 
the location of the principal pumps and meters. The location of the isolation and 
sluice valves is not included in order to keep this stage of the summary simple. 
Once a thorough understanding of the source, catchment and treatment of the 
supply has been established, it is important to summarize the system as a whole, 
indicating the location of the service reservoirs and the general configuration of 
the distribution system, before providing a detailed description of the distribution 
system. This initial description can be summarized in the form of a simple flow 
chart as shown in Box 3.3.
 
Once a detailed system description has been undertaken, an initial assessment can 
be made to ascertain if the water supply can, at least in principle, supply drinking-
water to within safe limits. This stage is critical as it determines whether there 
will be a need for investment in infrastructure in order to deliver safe drinking-
water. For instance, if the water source is heavily contaminated surface water with 
seasonally high turbidity loads and the only treatment applied is rapid sand filtration 
and terminal disinfection, it is unlikely that safe drinking-water can be assured. 
By contrast, the same source treated with coagulation, flocculation, settling, rapid 
sand filtration and chlorination could assure safe drinking-water.
Even where investment needs are identified, it is important to first put in place 
the components of the WSP that can be implemented without investment. This 
provides greater confidence that the water produced is as safe as can be achieved 
with current resources.
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Describing the distribution system
Assessing the distribution system may prove more challenging than water treatment 
works and catchments was with regard to description and preliminary analysis. It 
will require a particular understanding of the hydraulics of the system, the materials, 
age and size of the pipes and the location of the water supply pipes in relation to 
areas where hazards exist. Therefore, the departments undertaking monitoring 
and those responsible for water operation must share their knowledge of existing 
trends in water quality and hydraulic patterns within the network that might 
result in intermittence, discontinuity or pressure waves in supply. By drawing this 
information together in the system analysis, the WSP steering group can identify 
‘problem spots’ susceptible to contamination within the network.
Start by undertaking a preliminary desk-based analysis of the entire distribution 
network. The flow diagram in Figure 3.1 outlines the steps involved in analysing 
the distribution system and shows how each step links to the overall objective of 
establishing a Water Safety Plan.
During the desk-based assessment, the condition and details of the main service 
reservoirs or supply tanks within the water supply system should be noted. This 
should include a brief assessment of the physical condition of the distribution 
system. This can be assessed by analysing the condition of the pipe. Key indicators 
of pipe condition that could be considered are:
• Pipe age – the effects of pipe degradation becomes more apparent over time
• Pipe diameter – small diameter pipes are more susceptible to beam failure
• Pipe length and jointing - long water pipes are more susceptible to longitude 
breaks
• Pipe material – assess vulnerability of pipe to failure based on combination of 
hydraulic pressure exerted on the pipe and corrosivity of soil in which pipe is 
laid
Full details and justification for the selection of these indicators can be found in 
this series.
As well as the pipe network, the service reservoirs, supply tanks and major valves 
should also be assessed, including percentage level of sanitary risk associated with 
each facility. For example, findings from an initial assessment in Guntur, India 
revealed that 50 per cent of the supply tanks were of concern in the provision of 
safe drinking-water (see details in Box 3.4).
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Figure 3.1. Analysing the distribution network
Create a 
map of networkNOHas the water supply 
been mapped
Identify primary mains
Collect existing 
network data
Identify secondary 
infrastructure
?
YES
Divide water supply
Box 3.4. Supply tank detail
Name of 
the area 
and tank
No. of 
tanks
Age Zone Capacity
(m3)
Condition
B.R.Stadium 2 18 VIII 2,960 BAD
Additional information recorded: air vents were not covered due to broken mesh on vents, 
inspection covers were highly corroded from excessive chlorine use and tank inspection ladders 
were partially destroyed by corrosive chlorine in tank.
Additional information recorded included that air vents were not covered due to 
broken mesh on vents, inspection covers were highly corroded from excessive 
chlorine use and tank inspection ladders were partially destroyed by corrosive 
chlorine in tank.
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Box 3.4 highlights that within the supply tanks simple maintenance tasks may be 
identified that will improve water quality in anticipation of the development of 
the WSP, including the repair of air vents, replacement of inspection hatches and 
the covering of outlet valves.
All available maps of the water distribution network should be examined. These 
maps will range from professional cartographic imagery to hand-drawn sketch 
maps. Where there are no existing maps, it is recommended that a detailed sketch 
map is done. Using expert judgment, the location of major infrastructure (water 
treatment works, service reservoirs, valve boxes, primary trunk mains) should be 
plotted. These do not need to be to scale and approximate distances of primary 
mains and secondary mains can be estimated on a reconnaissance field visit. The use 
of a Global Positioning System (GPS) device will greatly assist in the development 
of these maps as the plotting of locations and distances can be more accurately 
measured. Where a GPS is not available, it may still be possible to map locations 
accurately if reasonable maps exist and/or if there are suitable landmarks to fix 
locations using triangulation. Distances can be estimated in a number of ways; 
using reliable maps or surveying techniques.
Box A1.1 (see Annexe 1) outlines an example of how to gain a better understanding 
of a piped distribution system where no maps are available.
Once the map has been prepared, the key infrastructure points of the system 
should be identified in detail. This includes the service reservoirs, booster stations, 
transmission and trunk mains, secondary service mains and major valves. This 
book uses the following definitions:
• Primary infrastructure includes bulk transmission mains from the works to 
the service reservoirs, the service reservoirs themselves and the valves and 
other infrastructure on these that control flow. 
• Secondary service mains are the principal supply pipes that deliver water from 
service reservoirs (or direct from the works) and to which community mains 
are connected. Secondary infrastructure also includes any supply tanks, valves 
or other infrastructure that controls the flow of the system.
Detailed flow diagrams should be prepared for the distribution system. Identifying 
how water flows through the system, major service reservoirs and the areas of 
distribution that each reservoir serve, major sluice valves, cross-connections 
between supply zones, major institutions, population densities, known leakage 
rates etc.
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Zoning of supply
Zoning breaks the distribution system into manageable sections. The zoning process 
is outlined in Figure 3.2.
Zoning ensures that at any particular point in the supply staff know both the 
source of the water and the major infrastructure that the water has passed through. 
Furthermore, zoning of the system enables the operator to estimate the likely impact 
of a contaminant entering into the system at any given point. Each zone may be 
used to identify sanitary risks particular to individual sections of supply with the 
aim of improving the operators ability to manage overall risk.
The zones are defi ned by the hydraulics of the water distribution network. Where 
a computerized hydraulic model is available for the system, specifi c cut off valves 
Figure 3.2. System analysis - zoning
Identify secondary 
infrastructure (isolation 
valves) and known flow 
patterns
NODoes the system have a 
computerized network map?
Digitize supply zones 
by data pressure readings
?
YES
Identify secondary 
infrastructure
Identified supply zones
Manually identify major 
supply zones NODoes the system have a 
hydraulic network model? ?
YES
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(permanently closed valves) and hydraulic deviation zones are demarcated. These 
are identified by negative pressure readings in selected sections of the network. 
This process obviously requires data such as that outlined in Box A1.2 (see Annexe 
1).
In the absence of extensive data or computerized models, expert judgement should 
be used to identify the existing closed valves in the system and the known flow 
paths within the network (see Box A1.3). Using the process outlined above, sketch 
maps of the system can be used and the operators of the system can mark on the 
maps the location of the permanently closed valves. Flow paths in the system can 
then be identified on the maps, showing the direction and extent of flow in the 
varied parts of the system.
An example of a sketch map approach can be seen in Box A1.3 (see Annexe 1). 
The drawing was done on site using A1 paper with the main infrastructure points 
being overlaid using tracing paper.
Identify intended uses and vulnerability
Following the zoning of the network, it is important to determine the intended use 
of water. This description may include:
• who the water is intended for and its intended use. What special considerations 
are in place for vulnerable groups such as infants, hospitalised patients, 
dialysis patients, the elderly and the immuno-compromized. Who the water is 
specifically not intended for;
• number of people served by different service levels (communal, yard, within-
house);
• socio-economic status of different communities served;
• how water is to be used and what exposure routes are relevant;
• what consumer education is in place for water use and how this is communicated, 
including how consumers are notified of potential contamination.
This information is important as it will be used in the hazard analysis to determine 
the susceptibility of the consumer to contaminated water. Ample description of 
an intended use is provided in Box 3.5. This description provides the team with 
further understanding of the nature of the population served and any particular 
characteristics that may increase vulnerability to waterborne disease.
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Reviewing performance and environment data
The final desk-based stage in describing the system is to undertake an evaluation of 
existing data to assess the performance of the system. This will include reviewing 
water quality data to assess whether there are:
• areas where free chlorine residuals are lost;
• areas where turbidity is often raised;
• areas where microbial contamination has often been detected;
• areas where leakage is commonly reported; and
• areas of regular intermittence.
There may be a number of data sources to support this exercise, some from the 
water supplier and some from surveillance bodies. The purpose of collecting this 
data is to evaluate whether there are areas within the distribution system that 
might impact on water safety. Some of the data may be qualitative, for instance 
when doing this exercise in Kampala, the leakage data used was collected during 
community interviews as part of sanitary inspection because there was little 
existing quantitative leakage data. The data for intermittence was collected in 
a similar manner. It is preferable to use quantitative rather than qualitative data 
where possible.
Describing the environment around the system
It is important in developing the description of the distribution system to understand 
the environment around it and to consider what hazards or hazard sources it may 
contain that could affect the supply.
Box 3.5. Ample ‘intended use’ description
• NWSC in Kampala provides water to approximately half the population.
• The water is intended for general consumption by ingestion from drinking and food 
preparation. Dermal exposure also gained to waterborne hazards through washing 
of bodies and clothes.
• About half of the people served rely on water supplied from public taps, with a 
further significant proportion relying on tanker services filled from hydrants. The 
socio-economic level of the population served by public taps is low and vulnerability 
to poor health is consequently high. A significant proportion of the population is 
HIV positive, which increases vulnerability further.
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The data to collect includes:
• sanitation coverage data (on-site and off-site);
• location of sewers;
• location of drains;
• major roads;
• population data;
• population served by the supply by area;
• areas of industrial development;
• areas that are low lying.
Much of this data is collected as surrogates for hazard information. For instance, 
population density can be used as a surrogate for faecal loading (Howard, 2003). 
Others are more directly related to potential hazard events, for instance, sewers 
that are very close to water supply mains could lead to contamination events. This 
data will be used to identify priority areas for inspection during the field assessment 
stage and later incorporated into maps of hazardous events and risk.
Collecting data on the population served is very important for the later stage of 
risk ranking. To do this, information on the number of people that may be affected 
by a contamination event must be estimated, and this requires knowledge of how 
many people use the water downstream of the point of entry of a hazard.
Some data about the environment will be in a similar form to the water supply 
data and may be very easy to locate on the water supply map. This includes 
information such as the locations of sewers, roads and drains. Other data may 
be of a different nature and be less precisely related to the water supply systems. 
Examples include population density, population served, industrial development 
and sanitation coverage. All this data can be expressed in a less detailed manner 
than the water supply data and therefore these maps will show ‘areas’ of particular 
concern overlying the supply main rather than specific points.
Summary
At the end of Stage 2: System description and analysis, the team will have a set 
of maps that show:
• the supply’s primary and secondary infrastructure;
• how many people use the water supply in different parts of the system;
• major hydraulic zones within the distribution system and thus water flows 
around the system;
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• areas where there is evidence of failures in water quality/safety management 
as a means of identifying particular areas of concern;
• the environment within which the supply is found as a means of identifying 
potential hazardous areas;
• known water quality failures within zones of the network.
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The next stage is to collect data from the field on the nature of the system, 
to investigate what risks exist that may affect the system, and to develop an 
understanding of how hazards could enter the supply and how these could be 
controlled. The first step in this process is to develop and pilot data collection 
tools. The tools used in a field assessment should be system specific and include 
sanitary inspections and the testing of selected physico-chemical parameters.
Before undertaking the assessment, consider your sanitary inspection tools. Findings 
from sanitary inspection field testing in the development of these guidelines 
noted the importance of standardization in order to maintain comparability. To 
achieve standardization, forms must be developed with personnel who have local 
knowledge of the design of individual facilities within the network (such as valve 
boxes, service reservoirs). These forms may be slightly different from the sanitary 
inspection forms used for monitoring, which may be modified for individual service 
reservoirs or valves.
It is recommended that two types of Sanitary Inspection (SI) tools are developed 
in order to assess and monitor sanitary risks within the system. These include:
• Assessment tools – A set of detailed quantitative tools designed to be used 
infrequently to assess the sanitary integrity of the system. These tools include 
water treatment plant audit forms and distribution system sanitary inspection 
forms.
• Monitoring tools – A set of tools designed to be used on a regular basis to 
monitor the sanitary integrity of specific points within the system. These tools 
include sanitary inspection forms specific to individual control points that 
provide information on the variable vulnerability within the supply.
Figure 4.1 outlines the appropriate first steps in developing sanitary inspection 
forms.
It is important to make a list of all known sanitary risks (or hazardous events) 
within the piped network. The team should consider all potential risks affecting 
the water supply and list each as a question. This should address all parts of the 
water supply system. As the lists can become very unwieldy, it is usually better to 
split the system into discrete common parts and develop sanitary inspection forms 
for each of these. For instance, there are likely to be forms specifically for:
• service reservoirs;
• major valves; and
• tapstands.
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Figure 4.1. Developing sanitary inspection forms
YES
Sanitary inspection 
forms composed
Design questions 
for all facilities
?NO
List known sanitary 
hazards in network
Divide sanitary hazards 
into infrastructure types
Are there common 
sanitary risks?
It is often useful to start with forms used elsewhere to help develop the system-
specifi c forms, but these should always be evaluated in relation to the actual system. 
Annexe 2 provides one set of example forms. The forms should be developed so 
that for each risk a question is asked that can be answered Yes or No.
• Yes answers mean that a risk is present;
• No means there is no risk.
The number of questions is immaterial, but it is better if the form is not too short 
(under 5 questions) or too long (over 20 questions). If it is too short then consider 
combining these questions with another sanitary inspection form. If it is too long, 
considering breaking the form into more than one form.
In developing the form, the fi rst step should be for the team to use the risk map 
developed in Stage 2 to make a series of visits to different parts of the distribution 
system. At each point, the team should assess what risks could be present and 
note down a full list of potential problems that may need to be addressed on the 
sanitary inspection form. These should be reviewed in a workshop and the group 
should reach a consensus about what problems should be included. The next step 
is to phrase questions around the problems noted so that they can be included in 
a standard sanitary inspection form.
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When developing the forms remember to use:
• simple phrasing;
• local terminology.
The inspection form may include questions that must be answered through some 
form of consumer interview. For instance, in systems where intermittence is not 
planned, questions may need to be included to ask consumers whether there has 
been intermittence in supply. For all parts of the system, the questions on the 
inspection forms will address the environment close to the point of inspection and 
the state of the infrastructure.
It is important that the end-users of the forms are able to understand the forms 
and to collect the information required rapidly and easily. This means that the 
questions on the form must be phrased in a way that ensures anyone using the form 
can understand what is being asked and simply by looking at the infrastructure be 
able to decide whether the risk is present or absent. It is essential that the forms 
are fi eld-tested by the team by visiting, completing the forms and analysing the 
results. The inspector should then assess whether they feel that they have gained 
the knowledge required. If not, the forms should be amended and re-tested until 
they are appropriate.
Figure 4.2. Finalizing sanitary inspection forms
Field test sanitary 
inspeciton forms at 
selected inspection points
Correct SI forms to 
suit field conditions
Sanitary inspection 
forms composed 
Finalize/print SI forms
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Box 4.1. Development of sanitary inspection forms
Kampala is served by five different service reservoirs. In-depth field verification of 
potential sanitary risks in each service reservoir revealed individual engineering design 
differences between the service reservoirs. In order to maintain comparability, sanitary 
risks common to all the reservoirs were identified.
For example: Tress could damage both below ground, elevated service reservoirs and 
overhanging trees branches could provide a ready access route for bird droppings into 
elevated tanks and service reservoir; and tree roots could damage the reservoir walls, 
resulted in the phrasing of a question common to both designs:
Can trees have an impact on the reservoir?                 Yes/No
(e.g. tree roots, overhanging branches, etc.)
Specific questions of SI form development are outlined in Box 4.1.
As well as the creation of SI forms, equipment to test physical-chemical parameters 
should be selected (see Figure 4.3).
It is recommended that (as a minimum) the following parameters should be 
tested:
• Free residual chlorine – to assess residual disinfectant protection available 
throughout piped network if chlorine disinfection is used. For the systems that 
use UV or ozonation, greater reliance should be placed on turbidity.
• Total residual chlorine – to assess whether loss of free chlorine is related to 
either a failure in chlorination or consumption from contaminants in the system. 
Again, this is only suitable for chlorinated supplies.
• pH – to assess whether chlorination had been performed within an acceptable 
range for effective chlorination (pH should be below 8).
• Turbidity – to assess whether there is likely to be increased chlorine consumption 
from either ingress, biofilm sloughing or disturbance of sediment.
To undertake the relevant analyses, it is recommended that field testing water 
quality equipment is used (e.g. hand-held chlorine/pH/conductivity/turbidity 
meter). Appropriate training in the use of this equipment should be undertaken as 
part of a field trial prior to undertaking the in-depth system assessment.
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Summary
At the end of this stage, the team should be aware of the importance and be 
competent in:
• developing, trialling and fi nalizing Sanitary Inspection (SI) forms;
• selecting appropriate physico-chemical parameters; and
• operating appropriate fi eld testing equipment.
Figure 4.3. Selecting equipment
Purchase or 
fix equipment
Calibrate equipment
NOIs there adequate 
equipment available ?
YES
Select appropriate 
physico-chemical 
parameters
Locate available 
equipment 
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The objective of the system assessment is to verify the information gathered on 
the network from Stage 2. Using information gathered in the system description 
and analysis, inspection points within the network should then be identified for 
field inspection. As the WSP is an iterative process, information gathered during 
the system analysis will be used to select the inspection points that are assessed in 
the field during Stage 4. These are identified using the selection criteria outlined 
in Box 5.1.
Due to the complexity of water distribution systems, it is recommended that points 
are identified according to the hydraulic supply zones. The use of supply zones for 
identifying inspection points ensures that the system assessment can be divided 
into manageable sections and also ensures that the results can be used to check 
whether any large-scale problems are noted, as the results can be linked to areas 
served by single service reservoirs or treatment works. The zone in which each 
inspection point is located should be recorded.
All the service reservoirs and valves located on primary and secondary mains 
should be included in the assessment. For instance 46 valves on primary and 
secondary mains in the Kampala system were included in the initial assessment. 
Box 5.1. Inspection point selection criteria
Hazardous environment Proximity to physical hazard (sewer, low lying area)
Proximity to area of high faecal loading (population density)
Evidence of previous 
problems
Historical record of microbial contamination
Historical record of intermittence in supply
Historical record of leakage
Evidence of frequent low residual chlorine levels
System characteristics of 
vulnerability
Proximity to primary/secondary infrastructure
Pipe Attribute (age/material/length)
Pressure/supply zone
Proximity to identified part of the system considered very 
vulnerable(??)
Susceptibility Number of people affected downstream
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This was very useful because it highlighted not only a range of consistent problems 
with design and maintenance, but also that some of the valves were not accessible 
and would have to be excluded from future planned inspections. Where there are 
a large number of valves, a sample of those on secondary mains may be selected 
for regular inspection taking into account the issues outlined further below.
In addition to primary and secondary infrastructure, a sample of points within the 
tertiary infrastructure should also be visited. This provides an opportunity to assess 
on the ground what types of risks may affect water safety close to consumer taps, 
and to also assess whether the major risks to water safety lie at a very local level 
or within the major infrastructure.
In selecting a sample of secondary and tertiary inspection points, it is important to 
use the data collated during the system description and analysis stage regarding the 
environment within which the mains are found. In the assessment, it is important to 
select sites that represent the range of selected criteria. When considering the factors 
noted in Box 5.1, sample sites should be selected with or without those factors. 
This helps to determine how important such factors are in creating problems.
A key part of the site selection is to consider the characteristics of the system as 
a means of identifying areas of different vulnerability to contamination. These 
characteristics are also used to develop risk maps which help select the critical 
points identified during the system analysis that need further assessment in the 
field. There are three methods that can be used to develop risk maps:
1. Qualitative risk assessments – In the absence of a GIS database, these methods 
enable operators to assess and manage risk in their network.
2. Semi-Quantitative risk assessment – This method involves the computation 
of variable risk levels based on semi-quantitative ranking methods into a GIS 
database.
3. Modelling-based assessments – The use of composite programming to estimate 
risk weightings for individual variables.
The third of these methods is discussed in the accompanying documents in this 
guidelines series. To support the development of a WSP, methods 1 and 2 are 
very appropriate and are designed to provide detail on the static or inherent 
risk associated with the system. Common to each of these approaches is the 
identification of indicators. These include the identification of pipe attributes and 
the hazardous environment in which pipes are found. The combination of these 
variables into a risk matrix forms the basis for the development of risk maps.
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The development of risk maps assists the WSP as it aids the identification of points 
of risk within the supply and prioritises areas to control water safety within the 
system. As pipe networks are underground, risk maps assist the WSP steering team 
to assess and manage surrogate measures of risk within the distribution system. 
These surrogates may include vulnerability assessments based on pipe material 
or hazard assessments using population density as a surrogate of faecal loading. 
The use of these surrogates helps prioritise which of the pipes is at greatest risk 
of contamination.
However, levels of information on both hazard and vulnerability in supply will 
vary according to the extent of data records. This information can be obtained 
from a number of sources including:
• review of supply records;
• review of maintenance records;
• sanitary inspection data.
It can equally be obtained from an understanding of the relationship between the 
pipe attributes (material, diameter, age) and the environment in which it is laid.
Once risk estimates have been established for the above indicators, it is 
recommended that an overall risk score is assigned to each inspection point within 
the supply. Using the quantitative risk estimate approach, it is possible to combine 
all the sub variables to calculate a total risk score. This may follow the example 
outlined in Box 5.2.
It is also important to select a range of inspection points from different hazardous 
environments in order to gain a representative overview of the system. Previous 
water quality data may also be used to ensure that inspections are carried out in 
areas of known previous problems and areas that have been relatively free of 
problems. This process is summarized in Figure 5.1. At each point visited, a reading 
should be taken to fix the point precisely. This is most effective when using GPS 
but triangulation can also be used where there are reliable maps and available 
landmarks or at the very least a sketchmap.
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Figure 5.1. Identification of inspection points
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Identification of 
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Identify inspection
points in low 
socio-economic areas 
Selection of field 
points for assessment
An example of inspection point selection is outlined in Box 5.3.
Once the inspection points have been identifi ed they are listed according to the 
sub zone in which they are located. If block maps exist for the system, these can 
be used to assist in the identifi cation of the points.
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Box 5.3. Selecting inspection points in Guntur, India
During the system analysis stage of the development of the WSP, the steering group 
identified a total of 206 risk points within the supply. The next step was to select the 
highest risk points as they would require assessment in the field. Of the total 206 
points, inaccessible points such as buried valves boxes were discounted and then the 
data from the following sources was used to select the points:
• Hazard and vulnerability – findings from Stage 2: System analysis and system 
description
• Institutional knowledge – known points of vulnerability within the system
• Susceptibility – data from the field survey and the team’s knowledge of the Guntur 
socio economic zones.
In total 163 points were selected for the Guntur supply. Initially these included all the 
primary infrastructure such as service reservoirs along with booster pumps/tanks and 
principle secondary infrastructure. Using historical records of leakage and chlorine 
residual data, an equal spread of points within the supply was chosen.
Practical considerations in the field assessment
It is essential that the assessment is properly planned and that the type of data 
collected be considered before the assessment is implemented. Once the sample 
sites have been selected they should be marked on the map and an estimate made 
of how many sites could be visited in one day. Hence, the total number of days 
required can then be calculated. Route maps for each day’s fieldwork should be 
prepared in advance and discussed with the inspectors covering that area. It is more 
cost-effective to visit several different sites yeilding different types of data in one 
area per day than to only visit points of a particular type in different areas. Thus 
the assessment teams should move through the system in a progressive manner. 
It is essential that staff have forms for all the different types of inspection points 
within each area, as well as daily record sheets for water quality data recording. 
The process for planning and implementing assessments is shown in the flow 
chart in Figure 5.2.
Summary
At the end of this stage the team will have a good understanding of how to undertake 
a system assessment. This includes:
• identifying inspection points;
• inspect point criteria;
• undertake a field assessment;
• tools and equipment required for field assessment.
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Figure 5.2. Planning and implementing system assessment
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Once the data on the system and hazards has been collected, the draft WSP can 
be developed. The WSP progresses through a number of key stages as shown in 
Figure 6.1 and is developed for each type of infrastructure within the supply. For 
example, a Water Safety Plan managing matrix would be developed for each of 
the water treatment works, service reservoir, valves, supply tanks, etc. As each of 
these points of supply has varying levels of risk, it is recommended that results 
from the system assessment are used to defi ne specifi c sanitary risks for each of 
Figure 6.1. Developing water safety plans
For each hazard event, 
consider how this may be 
controlled and define control 
measures
For each control measure 
determine the means of 
monitoring and the 
critical limits
Validate each control 
measure from literature or 
experimentation
For each control measure 
define what corrective action 
will be required when critical 
limits are exceeded
Determine how WSP as well 
as each control measure will 
be verified
WSP
Define hazard events using 
desk and field assessment 
data
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the identified inspection points within the supply. This can be done following the 
flow diagram in Figure 6.1.
Hazard events
This section provides guidance on how to develop the WSP matrix. It begins with 
examples and definitions of hazard events and continues by describing each stage 
of the WSP matrix through to the corrective action. At each stage of the matrix 
an example is provided.
Hazard
event
Cause Risk Control
measure
Critical limits Monitoring Corrective
actionTarget Action What When Who
Microbial 
contamination 
of service 
reservoir from 
birds
Hazard event is?
The first step in considering hazards which may affect the water supply is to 
identify potential hazards during the desk-based system assessment and the 
subsequent field assessment. This should identify both the type of specific hazard 
(e.g. chemicals, bacteria, viruses, protozoa) and the sources of hazards (e.g. sewers, 
on-site sanitation, drains, industries, etc).
In developing the WSP, the next step is to consider the impact of these hazards 
on the water supply. Experience has shown that in developing WSPs considering 
‘hazard events’ rather than specific hazards is the most effective way to identify 
and quantify risks to water safety (Deere, 2001). A hazard event in this context can 
be defined as a mechanism by which a contaminant of health concern is introduced 
into the water supply.
In water treatment works hazard events tend to be related to specific failures in 
treatment processes, for instance breakthrough of protozoa because of short-
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circuiting of settlers or breakthrough of bacteria caused by a failure in disinfection. 
For treatment processes, therefore, it is essential to develop hazard events that relate 
to problems that can or have been encountered in the operation of that particular 
type of treatment works.
In order to identify a hazard event in distribution systems, it is important to consider 
the source-pathway-receptor model of contamination, which is shown in Box 6.1. 
In this model the source is the source of the hazards, the receptor is the water 
supply (in this case the pipes that form the distribution system) and pathways are 
the means by which the hazards can leave the ‘source’ and reach the ‘receptor’.
The source-pathway-receptor model recognises that the presence of a hazard in 
the environment is insufficient on its own to represent a risk; a feasible pathway 
must exist that allow hazards to travel from the source to the water supply. When 
this occurs, it is a ‘hazard event’. In developing the WSP from the data collected 
during desk and field assessments, it is important to consider whether it is feasible 
for the hazard to leave its source, travel through the soil and enter the water pipe. 
For instance, drinking-water mains pipes are often laid deeper than sewer pipes 
and therefore it would be expected that a reasonable pathway (and so hazard 
event) exists if the mains pipes pass through soil, that has become saturated from 
a leaking sewer.
When considering hazard events, be aware that there may be some hazard events 
for which controls are already in place. An example is the presence of a cut-off wall 
between a sewer and mains pipe. The hazard event of sewage-contaminated water 
entering the mains pipe is still valid, but the team will need to consider how they 
wish to conceptualise the hazard event. For instance, the hazard event could be ‘cut-
off wall fails allowing sewage-contaminated water to submerge the mains pipe.’ 
Box 6.1. Source – Pathway – Receptor relationship
Source – Hazard event/environment
Pathway – Vulnerability of piped supply
Receptor – Receiving water infrastructure
ReceptorSource Pathway
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Alternatively, the hazard event could be ‘sewage contaminated water submerges 
mains pipe’. Either way of presentation is valid and the control measure may not 
in fact change significantly. It is, however, important for the understanding of the 
system and in determining whether the control measure is in place or whether the 
supplier needs to invest in a new control measure.
Hazard
event
Cause Risk Control
measure
Critical limits Monitoring Corrective
actionTarget Action What When Who
Microbial 
contamination 
of service 
reservoir from 
birds
Birds’
faeces 
enter 
through 
open 
inspection 
hatches
Cause?
Once it is accepted that a hazard may reach the mains pipe, a hazard event 
describing the process should be defined. An example is shown in Box 6.2.
Box 6.2. Hazard event scenario
Hazard Source = Sewer, drain, bird roosting on service reservoir
Hazard Movement Release = Leaking sewer, infiltration from drain, defecating bird
Hazard Pathway = Effluent from sewer, grey water flush in drains, rain washing bird 
faeces
Hazard Receptor = Pipe leaks (i.e. has holes), pipe is submerged
= HAZARD EVENT
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It is also important to identify where in the system the event could occur. This 
is important for the risk ranking stage, identifying priorities and developing 
operational monitoring plans. Defining hazard events where they could not really 
occur wastes resources and results in poorly directed WSPs. For instance, cross-
contamination between a sewer and a water main cannot occur in non-sewered 
areas. Equally, contamination of service reservoir by bird faeces resulting from 
an inspection cover being left open can only occur at a service reservoir that has 
an inspection cover.
Locating where the hazard event could occur in the system is important in the 
risk ranking approach. In this approach, the relative risk of the hazard event is 
determined in the following way:
1. Consider the likelihood of occurrence and the severity of the impact which 
should be done through a qualitative or semi-quantitative approach.
2. Consider the likelihood of an event occurring - it is important to remember that 
all events can happen. For instance, the risk of bird faeces entering an open 
inspection cover at a service reservoir is likely to occur. Service reservoirs are 
inspected often and it is likely that an inspection cover be left open regularly. 
Equally birds are likely to perch on the top of a service reservoir and are likely 
to defecate.
3. Consider prioritizing the occurrence of events - for instance, the risk of ingress of 
contaminated water into mains pipes may be more likely to occur in older parts 
of the system, in parts of the system with ductile iron pipes than in newer parts 
of the system with uPVC pipes. Developing this level of detailed understanding 
of the system and the hazard events that occur is important in estimating the 
risks of events occurring and prioritizing areas for control.
Severity
Severity is usually gauged in relation to both the number of people affected and 
the likely impact on those affected (for instance separated into morbidity and 
mortality). The nature of the hazards will determine the likely health outcome 
(for instance pathogens and massive pollution by chemicals may lead to mortality, 
whereas lower levels of chemicals may only lead to morbidity).
When estimating severity and defining severity profiles, it is important for the 
WSP team to consider the impact of short-term and long-term exposures. This may 
result in some long-term chemical exposures (e.g. to arsenic from source water) 
being given a higher severity rating than short-term exposures alone.
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Figure 6.2. Hazard events
NOIs there any way a hazard 
could leave the source? ?
HAZARD EVENT
No hazard event/no 
control measure NODoes a hazard source exist? ?
YES
NOWould the hazard be likely to 
find entry into the pipe? ?
NOCould the hazard be 
transported from the source 
to the pipe? ?
YES
YES
YES
The location of the hazard event will infl uence the number of people affected, for 
instance hazard events on major transmission mains or in service reservoirs will be 
likely to have an impact on many people, whereas a hazard event in a small tertiary 
pipe may only affect a very small number of people. This approach can be further 
refi ned by considering the vulnerability or susceptibility of the users affected and 
whether this will infl uence the outcome. For instance, poorer communities will 
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be more susceptible to many waterborne pathogens and therefore hazard events 
that affect these groups may have a greater severity than those that affect higher 
income groups.
Hazard 
event
Cause Risk Control
measure
Critical limits Monitoring Corrective
actionTarget Action What When Who
Microbial 
contamination
of service 
reservoir from 
birds
Birds’
faeces 
enter 
through 
open 
inspection 
hatches
Moderate/
catastrophic
Risk?
A risk-ranking matrix should be developed to address both likelihood and severity. 
Most approaches use some form of semi-quantitative ranking system by allocating 
numbers to different levels of likelihood and different levels of severity. A risk score 
is then calculated by multiplying these two numbers together as shown below.
Risk = Likelihood x Severity
The selection of the categories and the weighting allocated to different categories 
should be considered by the WSP team, as at present there is no uniform ‘industry 
standard’. Guidelines to definitions are provided in Box 6.3. It should be noted 
that semi-quantitative estimates are sufficient at this level.
The weightings used in Box 6.2 were applied in South-East Water, Australia (Deere 
et al., 2001) and in Uganda (Godfrey et al., 2002). These are applied to each of the 
inspection points in order to define the severity of risk associated with individual 
hazard events in piped supply.
The purpose of the table is to provide the users with a means by which to prioritise 
the risks to be controlled. In using these approaches, it is also important to use 
common sense. After categorizing hazard events, review them to make sure that 
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they make sense. For instance, make sure priority is not given to events that happen 
often but have little effect over rare events that kill people! This may require the 
team to revisit some of the decisions made and re-evaluate the category of severity 
or likelihood ascribed.
Determining control measures
For each hazard event, a control measure must be determined with associated 
critical limits that describe whether the control measure is functioning correctly (in 
compliance) or control is being lost (out of compliance). Control measures must 
be actions that can be taken that will prevent the hazard event from occurring and 
it should be clear from the description of the control measure what will be done to 
reduce the risks. The control measure is therefore closely related to how the hazard 
event was presented. Using the example of how we could present a hazard event 
relating to a mains pipe submerged in sewage leaking from a sewer, the control 
measure could be ‘a cut-off wall of X depth be maintained between the drinking 
supply main and the sewer’.
Control measures may already be in place and therefore the WSP will simply be 
a way to document/record how safety is already assured and to emphasise the 
importance of these measures. In other cases, the control measure may be a new 
Box 6.3. Risk and severity, some guidelines to 
definitions – Deere et al., 2001
Likelihood Definition
Almost certain Once a day
Likely Once per week
Moderate Once per month
Unlikely Once per year
Rare Once every 5 years
Impact Definition
Catastrophic Potentially lethal to large population
Major Potentially lethal to small population
Moderate Potentially harmful to large population
Minor Potentially harmful to small population
Insignificant No impact or not detectable
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working practice that must be introduced and therefore the WSP will justify why 
the new practice is required.
Hazard 
event
Cause Risk Control
measure
Critical limits Monitoring Corrective
actionTarget Action What When Who
Microbial 
contamination
of service 
reservoir from 
birds
Birds’
faeces 
enter 
through 
open 
inspection 
hatches
Moderate/
catastrophic
Inspection 
covers 
remain in 
place
Control measure?
In some other cases, the control measure will require investment. These investments 
cannot be included in the operational WSP, but must be identified and included 
in a list of needs for water safety management. In these cases, the utility should 
identify how this investment will be secured and planned. In the meantime, the 
immediate action may be limited to ongoing monitoring of water safety problems 
resulting from a lack of control measures.
In identifying the control measure, the team should consider the nature of the hazard 
event, the hazard source, the entry point into the supply and where intervention 
will be most cost-effectively applied. Control of a hazard event can be achieved 
through actions:
• at the hazard source (removal, containment or treatment);
• that break the pathway (removal, containment or diversion);
• at the supply (prevention of entry or treatment).
It will always be preferred that action is taken at the hazard source or pathway 
rather than at the supply, as these are ‘upstream’ actions. By preference control 
will also focus on removal or at least containment of hazards and pathways, such 
as the example in Box 6.4, rather than treatment of either the hazard or the supply, 
as these are preventive actions.
61
PLANNING WATER SAFETY MANAGEMENT
The selection of the appropriate control measure will be influenced by the feasibility 
of the actions and the relative cost; thus, whilst it would be preferable to remove 
hazard sources or their pathways, it may actually be more cost-effective to focus 
on the water supply. In some cases, intervention at hazard sources may not be 
possible immediately as actions may be required by other organizations or will take 
time to implement. Actions at both hazard sources and on pathways may still leave 
residual hazards within the environment which may require additional controls; 
therefore, it is likely that for many hazard events some control measure will be 
required at the water supply itself to prevent ingress into the supply. Actions will 
often be required at the hazard source, to break the pathway, and at the water supply 
Box 6.4. Removing hazards – lessons from the UK
A utility water supply in the UK noted a problem with Cryptosporidium in its source waters 
during periods of lambing. In response, they initiated an activity to remove pregnant 
ewes from the catchment each year and have found a very significant reduction in 
Cryptosporidium presence in their water.
Box 6.5. Control measure examples
Action Examples
Removal of hazard source Removal of animals from catchment at key times
Removal of on-site sanitation from recharge area
Containment of the hazard 
source
Pit latrine designs
Concrete lining on drains
Lining landfills
Impervious oil storage
Chemical waste
Reduced sewer leakage
Treatment at the hazard 
source
Leachate treatment at landfill sites
Wastewater treatment
Industrial waste treatment
Breaking pathways Cut-off walls between sewers and water supply mains
Protected vents at service reservoirs
Preventing pre-cursors Fencing at service reservoirs
Reducing traffic loads on mains pipes 
Action at the supply Reduced leakage (less ingress)
Reduced intermittence
Minor Potentially harmful to small population
Insignificant No impact or not detectable
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in order to secure sustained water safety. In some cases, the control measure may 
focus on a ‘pre-cursor’ to a hazard event. For example, an aspect whose presence 
or absence will make it easier for the hazard event to occur. The lack of a fence 
for instance, increases the likelihood of a number of hazard events (such as direct 
ingress of animals faeces through damaged pipes and access by animals to service 
reservoirs), but a fence itself would not result in a hazard event (see Box 6.5 for 
control measure examples).
Setting critical limits
For each control measure, critical limits must be established that will provide the 
basis of a judgement as to whether the control measure is out of compliance and 
therefore action is required.
Hazard 
event
Cause Risk Control
measure
Critical limits Monitoring Corrective
actionTarget Action What When Who
Microbial 
contamination
of service 
reservoir from 
birds
Birds’
faeces 
enter 
through 
open 
inspection 
hatches
Moderate/
catastrophic
Inspection 
covers 
remain in 
place
Inspection 
covers 
locked in 
place
Inspection
covers not 
in place 
or locked
Critical limit?
The nature of critical limits will vary, but there can be a lower limit (e.g. a 
minimum concentration of residual free chlorine), an upper limit (for instance a 
high sanitary risk score observed through sanitary inspection) or an envelope of 
performance (for instance pH within a specified range for effective chlorination). 
Although critical limits are by definition levels of performance at which action 
must be taken to ensure that control is maintained, they should be set at a level 
where exceeding the limits will not result in a significant risk to health. Critical 
limits must be directly or indirectly measurable or observable: otherwise, control 
performance cannot be assessed. Box 6.6 provides some examples of critical limits 
for a variety of control points.
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Defining a critical limit depends on exactly how the control measure exerts 
control over hazards or hazard events. Where the control measure involves some 
element of control over hazard sources (for instance the proximity of pit latrines 
to a borehole) then the critical limit will be the absence of the hazard source or 
its presence will be limited to a prescribed density. In some cases, the critical 
limit may be related to a factor that controls the development of a pathway, for 
example, fencing around a groundwater abstraction point would prevent animals 
from damaging the headworks or defecating close to the wellhead.
In many cases, controls are established in relation to treatment processes such as 
chlorination, and in these situations the critical limits will be dictated by the point 
at which the effective removal of hazards from the water no longer occurs, for 
instance, less than 0.1mg/l of free chlorine residual in a distribution system.
Validation
Each control measure and critical limit should be validated to ensure that the 
proposed control measures will be able to control the identified hazard to an 
acceptable level and that the critical limits are accurate in terms of potential 
breakthrough. Validation may be done either on the supply itself using natural 
organisms, or non-toxic index organisms and tracers through challenge experiments 
in laboratories.
In many cases, the same organisms used for verification will also be deployed in 
validation. However, when undertaking validation an essential component is to 
assess the likely health risk that may be derived from the lack of control. This can 
take the form of a risk assessment; the results of which will determine whether 
additional control measures are needed. The use of quantitative microbial and 
chemical risk assessments are recommended for such risk assessments. This is not 
described in detailed in the accompanying documents in this series.
Box 6.6. Critical limits for a variety of control points
Control point Critical limit
Target Action
Treatment works (Gravity flow 
rapid sand filters)
90% reduction in turbidity Turbidity of <5NTU
Service reservoirs Inspection covers locked in 
place
Inspection covers missing
Valve box Packing not leaking Evidence of leaking valves
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Monitoring
Every control measure needs a system to monitor its performance in relation to 
the critical limits. Monitoring should concentrate on parameters directly related 
to process control and should use methods that provide results that can be easily 
interpreted at the time of measurement or observation
Hazard 
event
Cause Risk Control
measure
Critical limits Monitoring Corrective
actionTarget Action What When Who
Microbial 
contamination
of service 
reservoir from 
birds
Birds’
faeces 
enter 
through 
open
inspection 
hatches
Moderate/
catastrophic
Inspection
covers 
remain in 
place
Inspection 
covers 
locked in 
place
Inspection
covers not 
in place or 
locked
Sanitary 
inspection
Chlorine 
residual
Daily Operating 
staff
Monitoring?
The frequency of monitoring for control points depends to a large extent on the 
nature of the control measure, the critical limits and the rapidity with which 
change may be expected to occur. The performance of some control measures 
can be expected to vary widely and change rapidly, and require frequent (and 
sometimes online) monitoring. This will typically include most control measures 
on treatment processes (e.g. chlorine dosing, coagulant dosing, filtration). In 
other cases, monitoring may be carried out frequently, but not online, for instance 
daily inspection of infrastructure or service reservoir covers. In other cases the 
monitoring may be very infrequent, for instance the number of animals in the 
catchment is a control measure so monitoring may be restricted to annual or six-
monthly checks.
Corrective actions
For each control measure identified, the team should outline a corrective measure 
that will be undertaken to prevent contaminated water being supplied, if, monitoring 
demonstrates that the critical limit has been exceeded. Although it may not be 
possible to define all actions required in advance, it is important to define some 
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course of action to follow. This is important as part of an overall preventive 
management approach. If a control measure is identified where no corrective action 
is needed, then it is essential that the water supplier undertakes further work to 
identify what options exist to rectify non-compliance.
Hazard 
event
Cause Risk Control
measure
Critical limits Monitoring Corrective
actionTarget Action What When Who
Microbial 
contamination
of service 
reservoir from 
birds
Birds’
faeces 
enter 
through 
open
inspection 
hatches
Moderate/
catastrophic
Inspection
covers 
remain in 
place
Inspection 
covers 
locked in 
place
Inspection
covers not 
in place or 
locked
Sanitary 
inspection
Chlorine 
residual
Daily Operating 
staff
Replace 
inspection
cover and 
check
chlorine
consumption
Corrective action?
The nature of corrective action depends on the nature of the control measure. 
Corrective action may consist of several interventions: immediate action to prevent 
the supply of unsafe drinking-water (switching to an alternative source, emergency 
chlorination,  advising consumers to boil water before drinking etc); and bringing 
the control measure back into compliance. If actions do not have an impact on either 
of these stages, they should not be considered as corrective actions. Figure 6.3 
illustrates the decision-making process to identify a corrective action.
Corrective actions may require regular revision and there should be a regular review 
of working practices, best practice guidelines and available literature to ensure that 
the corrective actions are those most appropriate and effective. When incidents 
occur within the system, it is essential that the corrective actions proposed are: 
reviewed to assess their efficacy; assessed to see whether they should be included 
as a corrective action; and assessed to determine whether any other actions are 
required for the future.
In a few cases the severity of a hazard event may not be known and in these 
circumstances the most appropriate response may be the collection of further 
information and monitoring of trends. This is more likely to occur in relation to 
66
WATER SAFETY PLANS: BOOK 1
Figure 6.3. Identifying corrective action
YESWill the action a prevent 
hazard  event occurring? ?
Not a corrective action
Corrective action 
YESWill the action directly stop a 
hazard event or the supply of 
unsafe water from occurring? ?
NO
YESWill action contribute to 
preventing a hazard event 
from occurring? ?
NO
NO
control measures for hazards: whose impact and importance to health is uncertain; 
or where the pathway to the water supply is not clearly understood; and the length 
of time it will take the hazard to reach the water source is vague; or whether it is 
known if changes in concentration may have occurred. In such circumstances, it 
may be appropriate to include monitoring of the released hazard as a corrective 
action in addition to actions to prevent further release of the hazard.
Summary
At the end of this stage, a WSP matrix can be developed for each of the identifi ed 
inspection points. This should begin with identifi cation of the hazard event and 
end with the identifi cation of corrective actions. This matrix can be used as the 
operational tool through which water quality can be managed in the system.
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Chapter 7
Stage 6: Verification – water quality analysis
Stage 1
Forming a 
WSP
steering 
group
Stage 2
System
description 
and  
analysis
Stage 3
Tools
development 
and
pilot activities
Stage 4
System 
assessment
Stage 5
WSP 
matrix
Stage 6
Verification 
(WQA)
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Analysing water quality is one way to periodically verify whether the WSP is able 
to ensure compliance with water quality targets or not (see further documents in 
this series). This should not be interpreted as an invitation to simply maintain the 
existing use of microbiological indicators, as their use is not related to routine 
operational control, but rather periodic assessment. Verification is the way to 
confirm that the WSP is providing water that meets the targets established for 
safe drinking-water. Verification typically involves operational audits (including 
physical inspection) and analysis of index/indicator micro-organisms and chemicals. 
Verification should be carried out periodically, and for piped water systems this 
is likely to involve a regular rolling programme of analysis, inspection and audit 
of water supplies.
Operational audits should include the systematic review of operational procedures 
and documentation to ensure that the WSP is used and that all actions required 
to maintain safety controls have been followed. During the audit the operations 
records of all treatment processes and distribution system maintenance should 
be reviewed to assess whether they reflect the requirements for each component 
of the system: outlined in both the WSP and the guidance documentation for 
the system. Spot checks in the field should also be carried out. The audit team 
should travel with the operations staff and watch them perform the tasks required 
under the WSP. These tasks will include: checking the frequency and efficiency 
of filter back-washing; checking the dosing of chlorine and routine maintenance; 
and cleaning of the distribution system. A key element of the audit process is to 
identify what operational shortcomings may be at fault when monitoring results 
deviate from the critical limits. The audit should identify both shortcomings in 
the overall WSP and modifications and improvements required.
Microbial analysis
In order for both the verification of the WSP and control measures using 
microbiological analysis to be effective, a range of organisms will be required. It 
is important that the purpose of using particular organisms is understood, to help 
interpret the findings.
• Process indicators: refer to organisms that are analysed because they indicate 
how well treatment processes are operating. A good example is sulphate-
reducing clostridia. This is a spore-forming bacteria and can be used to assess 
treatment performance and act as a partial surrogate for protozoa.
• Faecal indicators: refer to organisms whose presence indicates faecal 
contamination. This includes bacteria such as E.coli, thermotolerant coliforms 
and faecal streptococci.
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• Index or model organism: are organisms that indicate pathogen behaviour 
(and in some cases presence). This group includes coliphages as models of 
virus behaviour.
The classification is important to bear in mind when interpreting the findings of 
the analysis of micro-organisms. The presence of process indicators after treatment 
implies that the process(es) are not working properly and that there is a risk of 
pathogen breakthrough. They do not prove that pathogens are present, but do 
show whether the processes designed to remove them are functioning properly. 
The presence of faecal indicator organisms can indicate that either the treatment 
processes are not working at an optimal level or that ingress may have occurred. 
Pathogens may still be present. This suggests that the WSP is not working correctly 
and that investigations are required to improve WSP implementation. Crucially, 
the presence or absence of these organisms does not in itself describe safety which 
must be interpreted in light of other assessments.
The testing of microbes should be carried out throughout the treatment works and 
in the distribution systems. It is recommended that sulphite-reducing clostridia 
are used for treatment works as the resistance to chemical disinfection is similar 
to protozoa. As they are smaller than most protozoa their removal would also 
ensure that all protozoa are removed. Analysis of sulphite-reducing clostridia is 
not recommended in the distribution system: their presence will be difficult to 
interpret. These are environmentally robust organisms and their presence in the 
distribution system could reflect very old or very recent contamination. It will 
also be unclear whether their presence resulted from treatment failure or ingress 
within the distribution.
E.coli and faecal streptococci should be used at the treatment works (where their 
role will be primarily as process indicators) and in the distribution system (where 
they will be primarily used as faecal indicators). Bacteriophages (particularly 
somatic coliphages) can also be analysed throughout the system. In the treatment 
works it will function primarily as a process indicator were it provides evidence 
of whether viral removal is likely to be effective. In both the treatment works and 
the distribution system, the presence of bacteriophages will indicate the likely 
presence of pathogenic viruses.
Chemical analysis
In addition to microbial analysis, chemical analysis will be required during 
verification. The selection of chemical parameters will depend on which chemical 
hazards were identified as being present during the hazard assessment. If the 
70
WATER SAFETY PLANS: BOOK 1
hazard was identified as being in the source water, analysis may be undertaken 
either to check trends, or, if treatment is being applied, to ensure removal occurs 
at the correct level.
If the chemical hazard is introduced during treatment, one of two strategies can 
be employed. If there is concern that there may be residual levels of the hazard 
present even after dosing, then, analysis may be undertaken for the substance 
itself (an obvious example being residual aluminium). If, however, the problem is 
associated with impurities in the treatment chemical (e.g. alum contaminated by 
lead), then it is more effective to request that the supplier of the product provide 
quality control data.
Two particular chemical hazards will depend on the age and materials used in the 
distribution system: copper and lead. Copper is sometimes derived from pipes 
used in household plumbing systems and there will be an increased risk of copper 
presence with acidic waters. Lead may also be present from lead pipes or solders. 
Copper is most effectively verified through analysis. Verification for lead is more 
problematic. In cases where this is derived from pipes directly, the verification 
should focus on monitoring the numbers of lead pipes replaced. Where it is derived 
from solders, verification may require both water quality analysis and monitoring 
the use of solders.
Within distribution systems, if a particular source of chemical hazard has been 
identified then verification should include analysis of the chemical hazard expected 
to be present. For example, distribution systems that could be inundated by surface 
water bodies that receive effluent from small-scale tanneries, should be tested for 
chromium.
Designing a sampling network for water quality analysis in 
verification
The water quality analysis will be undertaken at the treatment works to verify 
performance, and through the distribution works. Verification works should be 
undertaken using two mechanisms:
• Assessments;
• rolling programmes.
In assessments, a relatively large number of samples will be taken to analyse the 
microbial indicators, turbidity, chlorine residuals, pH and any chemical substances 
identified as important. Sanitary inspections will also be performed at the same 
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time. Samples will be taken from raw waters and the outlets of each treatment 
process unit to assess the performance of each process in improving water quality. 
Intensive assessments are designed to provide one-off cross-sectional surveys of 
the system performance. These assessments would be combined with a detailed 
operational audit (as determined by inspection of infrastructure and a review of 
operational records and documentation related to the WSP). 
Assessments at treatment works will use the full range of process and faecal 
indicator organisms identified earlier and may also include index organisms. For 
treatment works, the assessments will require repeated sampling and analysis of 
the water after each unit process over a period of several days. In Uganda, for 
instance, this was done over three days. The assessment of water as it passes 
through the treatment works should also be supported by an analysis of the water 
within the distribution system to assess what changes are expected as the water 
moves through the whole supply. Sample points should include all major primary 
and secondary infrastructure (service reservoirs, major valves) and a sample of 
tertiary infrastructure. 
Where there is a hydraulic model of the system, planning of the timing and 
location of the sampling points in the supply should be determined by estimating 
the amount of time it would take for water to reach different parts of the system. 
In this way, the water can be tracked as it passes through the supply and a more 
accurate picture of deterioration in water quality developed. If such a model does 
not exist, then on each day of sampling at the treatment works, samples should be 
taken from different elements of the primary and secondary major infrastructure 
and a sample of tertiary infrastructure.
 
Rolling programme
A rolling programme of verification should also be developed that operates in a 
complementary fashion to the operational monitoring programme. Where there is 
a well-developed surveillance body, the rolling programme of verification may be 
fully delegated to the surveillance function. Where this is not the case, or where a 
more audit-based approach to surveillance is implemented, the water supplier will 
be responsible for ensuring these forms of verification are performed. 
In rolling programmes of verification, the main emphasis is likely to be on a single 
or very limited range of microbial indicators. It is likely that the majority of tests 
will be for E.coli. The design of the sampling network for water quality analysis 
performed as part of the verification exercise needs to balance both the need 
for representative samples to be taken and the cost. Although it is desirable that 
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sampling programmes be designed on a statistical basis, this is not often feasible, 
as the number of samples required is very high. WHO suggest a population-based 
approach to sampling as shown in Box 7.1.
Documentation
The final stage of developing the WSP is to prepare a set of documents that describe 
how water safety will be maintained in the supply. This would typically include:
• risk assessments performed on the supply;
• the water safety plan itself;
• standard operating procedures (SOPs) for analyses for operational monitoring 
and verification;
• SOPs for sanitary inspections;
• data on validation;
• lines of reporting and communication with the public;
• results of operational monitoring;
• results of verification; and
• details of all corrective actions undertaken.
Documentation should be stored in the risk manager’s office with copies distributed 
as appropriate. Documentation should be updated regularly as improvements are 
made to the WSP and associated activities. Furthermore, public annual water safety 
reports should be prepared to promote transparency and accountability within 
water safety management.
Box 7.1. Sample numbers by population
Population Number of samples per month
Below 5000 3 samples per month (source/treatment works plus 2 in distribution)
5000 -100,000 3 samples plus 1 extra sample per 5000 extra 
people
Above 100,000 1 sample per 10,000 people plus 10 samples
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Chapter 8
Using the WSP
Once each of the development stages of the WSP has been followed and a WSP 
has been established, it should be used as the primary tool for water safety 
management in the water supply. Therefore it is an operational tool to support 
water safety management and should form the basis of workload planning for 
relevant staff. Ultimately, the risk manager should take overall responsibility for 
managing the water safety plan. This will include: ensuring that all the required 
monitoring is performed; action taking and notification of key staff when critical 
limits are exceeded; planning and overseeing the verification plan; ensuring that 
all data are stored appropriately; prepare and submit reports as required; planning 
and implementing a system of internal audit of water supplies with WSPs; and 
undertaking periodic validation exercises.
It is extremely important that these systems are established and followed if water 
safety management is to be implemented effectively. The systems referred to 
here mean the procedures by which information is shared and acted upon by both 
different departments within the utility and external stakeholders. An example of 
Box 8.1. Operationalization of WSP – an example from 
Uganda
Following three years of research of the application of WSPs in Uganda, NWSC decided 
to implement a WSP in both Kampala and Jinja. The operationalization of the WSP has 
taken different forms. In Kampala, NWSC have invested substantial funds to upgrade 
the system by rehabilitating principle infrastructure as well as installing sampling taps 
for all the control points. In Jinja, NWSC have increased their frequency of monitoring 
of the control points and developed a comprehensive monitoring and verification 
plan. As the Managing Director of NWSC said “the advantage of the WSP is that it 
provides a system for managers and operators to work together to understand their 
water supply more effectively.”
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the operationalization of a WSP can be found in National Water and Sewerage 
(NWSC) Water Safety Plans (WSP) Operational Manual, Kampala, Uganda 
(NWSC et al., 2003).
Communication
The lines of communication and reporting that are required throughout the WSP 
process are vitally important. This is a challenge for both the ‘risk sector’ and 
the water supply sector. It is important to identifying: who in the water supply 
organization will be notified of the problem when it occurs; which other people 
will be notified and advised; and which internal and external groups will be notified 
when the problem is rectified (Lang et al., 2001) (see Box 8.2). Lang et al. (2001), 
suggest that normally either the operations staff or water quality control staff 
would be the first to identify if a problem had occurred, either through their regular 
inspections and work on the system or because of customer complaints. Minor 
problems should be reported to the risk manager to instigate corrective action on 
the system, and only when major problems are recorded should the operations 
manager be informed. This will streamline the reporting process and ensure that 
appropriate action is taken. The risk manager should also be responsible for: 
deciding whether wider notification is required; what additional actions may be 
needed to avoid supply of unsafe water; and who should mobilize water quality 
control staff to undertake the necessary analysis of water.
Effective and timely communication between the monitoring and management 
sections of the utility should occur routinely as part of monitoring activities, and 
is essential when critical limits have been exceeded and action is required. This 
allows a number of key actions to be addressed and incorporated into the field 
implementation:
• Ensure that all members of the utility know which departments are responsible 
for key tasks regarding the WSP (e.g., monitoring, verification, operational 
control, approval of additional works, etc.).
• Nominate responsible staff members to ensure that information is passed 
between monitoring and management sections. This should clearly identify 
who within the organization should transmit information, who should receive 
it directly and who should receive copies.
• Establish a written agreed reporting procedure for the transfer of information 
both when control measures exceed critical limits and when they are in 
compliance. One utility in Australia which adopted HACCP plans for their 
water supplies, automatically sends emails to senior staff whenever a critical 
limit is exceeded. This has improved the timeliness of responses and ensures 
that more direct management involvement is sustained.
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• Notify relevant people when corrective action has been completed - it is 
necessary to outline when this information should be provided, and by whom, 
and who within the organization should be informed.
• Confirm adequacy of corrective actions - this should clearly define how rapidly 
the monitoring section will visit and test the control measures following the 
corrective action.
Communication within organizations is often poor and fails to deliver expected 
actions. In some utilities, the relationship between the monitoring and operations 
department is rather antagonistic: the operations department views the monitoring 
department as some kind of ‘policing’ body that is only concerned with identifying 
failures and inadequacies.
These problems may be overcome by two processes at the core of the WSP 
approach:
• The use of multi-disciplinary teams in developing the WSP – this makes 
subsequent inter-departmental collaboration easier as roles, responsibilities 
and required interactions are more clearly defined.
• Feedback – the monitoring department provides feedback to the operations 
department and managers when the outcomes of monitoring and verification 
are good, as well as when failures are noted. Developing systematic reporting 
mechanisms, including regular meetings where possible, is essential in 
strengthening the implementation of the WSP. These may also provide 
opportunities for improvement in the WSP and in building trust between the 
different departments.
Operations departments are typically more powerful than monitoring departments 
and this may mean that the monitoring process and the use of the results are not 
taken seriously enough to improve the supply. The inter-disciplinary nature of 
WSPs should offer an opportunity to overcome these problems by highlighting the 
benefit to the operations department of effective and focused monitoring activities. 
Ensuring that there is acceptance of the need for monitoring and the use of results 
to make improvements when required, also forms part of the prerequisites of 
institutional commitment to water safety.
Internal communication can be facilitated by establishing a regular system of 
information sharing (via reports provided on a weekly basis and after incidents) 
supported by regular meetings (preferably monthly) to discuss water safety and 
annual reviews of the WSP. This should be co-ordinated by the risk manager.
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Operational monitoring
The monitoring plan provides the water quality and operations staff with a 
framework for their routine monitoring activities at the treatment works and within 
the distribution system. It should: include a detailed description of all the points 
within the water supply where monitoring will be undertaken; show how often 
monitoring will be performed; and by whom.
The water safety manager should ensure that this plan is followed by the appropriate 
staff. Where the monitoring will be performed by staff within the water quality/
safety management department, the water safety manager should review monthly 
and annual work plans to ensure that these reflect the monitoring requirements of 
the WSP. The water safety manager should also review the reports prepared by the 
monitoring teams to ensure that an adequate level of activity has been maintained 
and that all cases where critical limits were exceeded have been reported and 
appropriate action taken.
It is also important to consider how to establish systems to ensure that any 
incident where a critical limit is exceeded is rapidly detected. This is particularly 
important at points where the impact of failure entails a high risk, for instance 
failure in treatment or in a major service reservoir. Many utilities in developed 
countries have installed on-line chlorine monitors that trip an alarm and may 
cut the supply when the free chlorine drops below the required concentration. 
Although often considered too expensive in developing countries, on larger water 
supplies such equipment may be affordable and given the likely impact on very 
large numbers of people, may result in significant health protection. The costs of 
the alternative approach (a staff member to regularly test water manually) should 
also be considered and a cost-benefit analysis performed. It is unlikely, however, 
that systems used in developed countries with remote telemetry fitted to alarms 
will be feasible, in part because it may be difficult to guarantee that action to repair 
the fault with the chlorine dosing will be repaired within a very short time frame, 
which is essential to support such approaches. Box A1.4 (see Annexe 1) outlines 
selected monitoring points.
Who should do the monitoring?
The identification of appropriate personnel to perform monitoring functions is 
a critical component of implementing the WSP. Different types of monitoring 
may be undertaken by different members of staff. It is therefore essential that the 
water safety manager, or a staff member reporting to the water safety manager, 
coordinates activities properly: ensuring that there is a central record of all results; 
and a clear overview of all monitoring which has been undertaken. As some 
monitoring is likely to be performed by staff in the operations departments, the 
78
WATER SAFETY PLANS: BOOK 1
water safety manager will also need to liaise with other departments.
At water treatment works the monitoring will be most appropriately performed 
by the water treatment plant operators, as they will be based at the treatment 
works and will be able to perform the frequent, routine monitoring likely to be 
required. Staff operating water treatment works are sometimes within an operations 
department and sometimes within a water quality department. If the treatment 
works is under the remit of the operations department, it is important that systems 
are established to ensure the routine reporting of results to the risk manager. This 
may be a daily routine transfer of results with immediate notification of failures, 
when these occur.
It may be cost effective to delegate monitoring in the distribution system to 
operations staff as part of their routine work at key points within the distribution 
system, for instance service reservoirs. In many ways this would be the preferred 
option as corrective actions needed when critical limits are exceeded are likely to 
be the responsibility of the operations department. Where this approach is followed, 
it is essential that records from all monitoring are passed to the water quality/safety 
manager to ensure that a complete record is maintained.
In the distribution system there will be some fixed points for monitoring, usually at 
service reservoirs and major valves. At these sites, monitoring would be expected 
to be daily, weekly or at least monthly. Some less important valves may receive 
monitoring on a quarterly basis. Within the tertiary infrastructure, sampling will 
be on the basis of a rolling programme of visits throughout the system. The aim 
being: to gain a clear understanding of recurrent and persistent problems; and to 
develop programmes that reduce risks.
Corrective actions
Corrective actions will primarily be the responsibility of the treatment plant 
operators and the distribution operations department. It is therefore essential that 
corrective actions identified for control measures are agreed between the water 
safety management department and the operations department. Without agreement, 
it may be difficult to ensure that actions are taken when they are required.
Planning for corrective actions will require that the operations department identify 
staff in different parts of the system who will be responsible for responding to 
incidents and undertaking corrective actions. In some utilities, no differentiation 
is made between routine and response work, and where incidents are rare, this 
is the most cost effective approach to ensure that staff time is used efficiently. In 
utilities where critical limits are often exceeded, the utility may establish a team 
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of staff identified to respond to emergencies in addition to the team undertaking 
routine operation and maintenance work. In these cases, it is likely that the staff 
will rotate, with some time spent in routine operation and maintenance and some 
in the response team.
The operations department should ensure that the appropriate tools and materials 
are readily available to carry out corrective actions, and that on completion of 
the required work, the water quality department are notified to verify water 
safety. Records of actions taken should be kept and brief reports prepared for the 
management and water safety management department. Planning for corrective 
action should include establishing guidelines or targets for the speed of response 
to an incident. This often becomes a useful tool for monitoring performance and 
promoting the utility amongst its existing and potential customers by demonstrating 
good practice.
When work is undertaken on distribution systems, both as part of corrective 
actions and during routine operation and maintenance, it is essential that a code 
of practice for hygienic working is established. This typically includes ensuring 
that all materials used in the distribution system are kept clean, that vehicles are 
never used in wastewater systems, that staff are not allowed to directly work on 
the distribution system if they have been working on the wastewater system, and 
that sanitation facilities are available for staff on-site. Some utilities also require 
that staff both inform other staff if they have had a water-related infectious disease 
(which may prevent them working on the distribution system) and have regular 
medical checks. Many utilities prepare simplified codes of practice which are given 
to staff and are put into every vehicle used for work in the distribution system. 
This provides staff with a constant reference point to ensure that hygienic working 
practices are always followed.
Verification plan
Verification may be undertaken by the department within the utility responsible for 
water quality or water safety, or by an external laboratory contracted by the utility 
to undertake this work. In some situations, verification may be performed by a 
mixture of approaches, with some testing by the utility and an external contracted 
laboratory carrying out other analyses.
The risk manager should be responsible for ensuring that the verification programme 
is properly planned: the required number of samples being taken at the appropriate 
sample sites. It is likely that, like the monitoring programme, there will be a mixture 
of fixed and variable sampling sites. The detail of each sampling round should be 
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prepared by the teams responsible for staff undertaking the sampling and analysis 
in the field, and approved by the water safety manager. All data should be kept on 
a database and regular reports prepared.
Verification in the distribution system will be an ongoing rolling programme 
involving monthly testing. Verification at the treatment works for E.coli will 
also be ongoing, with regular tests performed on raw and finished water as part 
of the overall monthly verification plan. Additional exercises may be considered 
for treatment works on a periodic basis to analyse a wider range of organisms. 
For instance, there may be a quarterly programme of verification using sulphite-
reducing clostridia or coliphage.
In addition to analysis of water quality, verification should also entail an audit of 
the WSP and of operational practice as a means of demonstrating compliance with 
good practice. It is useful to use internal as well as external audits, although the 
latter is a requirement if formal registration with a management system (such as 
HACCP or ISO) is followed.
Davison et al., (2004) outline in some detail the information that should be obtained 
when undertaking an audit or reviewing a WSP. The basic purpose of reviewing the 
WSP is to ensure that the team preparing and/or implementing the WSP have:
• taken all feasible hazard events into account;
• identified appropriate control measures for each event;
• established how the measures will be monitored;
• established critical limits for each control measure;
• identified a corrective action when critical limits have been exceeded; and
• set up a system of verification.
It is expected that most WSPs will be iterative and will undergo regular updating and 
improvement, as both the understanding of the system improves and investments 
are made. Therefore regular review and update of WSPs for individual supplies 
should be built into the work plans of the water safety team.
Conclusions
This document has outlined the six main stages in developing a Water Safety Plan. 
In line with the revised 3rd edition of the World Health Organisation Guidelines 
for Drinking-Water Quality (WHO, 2004), the Water Safety Plan approach is the 
recommended means of assuring water quality in piped urban systems. It has 
covered a number of key areas of importance in developing WSPs: the need for 
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an interdisciplinary team to manage the WSP development; the development of 
WSPs in the absence of detailed data or maps of the supply; and the importance 
of increased monitoring and decreased verification in light of the logistical and 
financial constraints facing water utilities in the developing world.
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Box A1.1. Mapping piped systems when no 
map was available – Guntur, India
Data collection on piped systems is very difficult where there are few available maps. 
For example in Guntur, the only available maps were 25 years old and were of the 
road network. There were no water network maps available.
To overcome this difficulty KAKTOS Consult. in collaboration with the Public Health 
Engineering Department and Guntur Municipal Council (GMC) developed the following 
methodology:
• Use road map as basis
• Conduct a road network survey for roads built within last 25 years
• Using the road as a reference, mark the boundaries of the administrative zones
• By zone, using expert judgement, identify the approximate location of the water 
treatment works and supply tanks
• Mark the primary pipeline on road map from treatment works to tanks
• Define diameter of primary/secondary mains (Guntur - >200mm = primary 
main)
• Use field validation to locate secondary pipelines and major valves
• Prepare a map using either tracing paper or computerized digitisation
• Divide the map into blocks (in Guntur each block = 0.5km2)
                                       
 Map of Guntur Pipelines (Prem Chand et al., 2003)
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Box A1.2. Zoning with data - Example from 
Kampala, Uganda
In the Kampala system, a total of six major supply zones were identified based on the 
service reservoirs. The zones were demarcated on a pipe network map of the system 
through hydraulic mapping by the operations managers and engineers. During the 
mapping process, the supply patterns from the two Kampala water treatment works 
(Gaba 1 and Gaba 2) to the service reservoirs were marked along with connections 
on the high and low-pressure transmissions mains. From each of the supplied service 
reservoirs water movement was then traced using block maps. Major isolation valves, 
cut off points or points of potential mixing were marked.
Within these six zones there are 22 sub zones, each with its own discrete area of 
supply. These are mostly defined by separate booster stations and/or supply tanks. 
Although these sub zones are important as a tool in the management of individual 
components of the system, it should be emphasized that the foundation of the 
system lies in the six main supply zones. From a water quality perspective, it is these 
six zones that are key to the understanding of contaminant dispersal and movement 
throughout the system.
 
Source: (Godfrey et al., 2002)
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Box A1.3. Zoning without data – an example from 
Jinja, Uganda
The network has no hydraulic model and limited available data. To identify the supply 
zones, the primary and secondary mains were identified (blue and yellow respectively) 
on paper copies of maps. Three zones were then demarcated: low level (red), high 
level (yellow) and booster tank (green). The extremes of these zones were plotted as 
an overlay on the map on tracing paper. These were divided according to the location 
of the isolation valves.
 Source: (Tibatemwa et al., 2003)
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Box A1.4. Monitoring plan Kampala, Uganda
The map indicates the identified monitoring points for Kampala. These include 
treatment works, primary valves, secondary valves, supply tanks, service reservoirs 
and randomly selected standpipes. 
The monthly frequency of monitoring for each of these sampling points to be 
recommended in Kampala was:
• Water treatment works  = 2x  per week
• Service reservoirs    = 2x  per week
• Supply tanks     = 1x  per week
• Primary valves     = 1x  per week
• Secondary valves    = 1x  per month
• Tertiary standpipes    = 1x per month
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Annexe 2: Case study examples
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Activity Kampala Jinja Guntur
Step 1:  
Forming the team
System is managed 
through private lease 
contract between the 
government run by NWSC 
and ONDEO Uganda 
Services Ltd (OSUL). 
Representatives from 
both were members of 
an interdisciplinary WSP 
steering group.
NWSC is responsible 
for both production and 
distribution of the water. 
A steering committee was 
formed that comprised 
only of NWSC staff and 
not staff from private 
operators. The team was 
coordinated by the Area 
Engineer assigned the role 
of Risk Manager.
Guntur is located in the 
state of Andrapradesh, 
India. The water 
supply system supplies 
75,000m3 per day 
through approximately 
600km of pipeline  The 
system is operated by 
the Guntur Municipal 
Corporation (GMC). Water 
quality is monitored in 
isolation by tap inspectors 
from The Public Health 
Engineering Department 
(PHE).
Step 2:  
System Analysis
System is fed from a 
surface water source 
in Lake Victoria to two 
treatment works following 
conventional treatment 
unit processes. The 
combined capacity of the 
works is 95,000m3/day, 
which is then distributed 
to five major service 
reservoirs. There are two 
distinct pressure zones 
(high and low) in the 
supply. No hydraulic model 
exists for the supply but 
0.5km2 block maps are 
available for the entire 
supply area. Total of 182 
risk points identified.
System is fed from a 
surface water source 
from the Napolean Gulf 
of Lake Victoria to one 
treatment works following 
conventional treatment 
unit processes. The 
operational capacity of the 
works is 26,000m3/day, 
which is then distributed 
to two major service 
reservoirs. There are two 
distinct pressure zones 
(high and low) and three 
supply zones identified 
using ‘expert judgement’ 
or local knowledge of the 
supply.
No system maps existed 
for Guntur. Innovative 
approaches such as semi 
qualitative risk mapping 
were therefore used. A 
total of 206 points were 
identified throughout the 
system
Step 3:  
Development of tools
Two sanitary inspection 
tools used: Assessment 
tools used infrequently 
to assess the sanitary 
integrity of the system 
and Monitoring tools 
designed to be used on 
regular basis to monitor 
the sanitary integrity of 
specific points with in the 
system. Standardization 
of questions in these tools 
was critical for comparing 
risk.
As in Kampala As in Kampala
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Activity Kampala Jinja Guntur
Step 4:  
System Assessment
Total of 152 inspection 
points were assessed using 
sanitary inspections and 
selected physico chemical 
analysis. Based on results 
of the assessment 82 high 
risk control points were 
identified.
Total of 46 points were 
identified throughout the 
system. They included 
35 in high level pressure 
zones and 11 in low level 
pressure zones. A team of 
three people worked took 
three days to complete the 
assessment. Between 10 
and 15 inspection points 
were assessed per day.
After discussion all the 
buried valve boxes, road 
crosses with no available 
data were removed 
Removal of these points 
made the total number of 
inspection points through 
out the system is 163, 
a very high number for 
a 600km system. From 
the initial 163 points, 
62 control points were 
identified.
Step 5:  
Water Safety Plan matrix
WSP matrices were then 
developed for each point.
As in Kampala based on 
sanitary inspection
As in Kampala based on 
Sanitary inspection
Step 6:  
Verification
Two assessments were 
done, one before the 
launch of the WSP and 
one six months later. 
Samples were taken at the 
water treatment works and 
at 50 of the 82 identified 
control points. Samples 
were tested for sulphate 
reducing clostridia, 
faecal streptococci and 
thermotolerant coliforms.
The initial exercise showed 
that the Jinja system is 
generally of good sanitary 
integrity. The level of 
sanitary risks identified at 
the service reservoirs and 
tanks were low at 10% 
risk. Major problems were 
corrosion inside the metal 
tanks, and uncovered 
vents
System indicated very 
high levels of microbial 
contamination. Findings 
from the system 
assessment indicated 
average pH levels of 6-7, 
turbidity of 5-7NTU and 
variable residual chlorine 
levels. During the microbial 
verification exercise, 
52 control points were 
sampled. 
Results and 
Recommendations
The assessments revealed 
relatively low levels of 
microbial contamination 
in the Kampala system 
suggesting that it was 
a well run supply. 
Findings from the system 
assessment revealed 
low (or non existent) 
levels of residual chlorine 
suggesting either 
excessive absorption 
of chlorine into biofilm 
and/or leakage/ingress 
of contaminated water in 
supply. High sanitary risks 
were identified in service 
reservoirs, supply tanks 
and major valves. Control 
points identified at major 
valves required upgrading 
of valve boxes and 
installation of sampling 
taps to enable access for 
water sample collection.
The Jinja system is a 
relatively small supply 
with few control points. 
Findings indicated high 
levels of contamination in 
low lying areas as valve 
boxes were submerged. 
Recommendations 
included weekly monitoring 
of each of the 30 control 
points once per week. 
This will mean a total of 
30 x 4 weeks per month 
(Total 120 per month). 
Verification will include 
approximately 30 samples 
per month.
Findings indicated high 
additional dosing of 
bleach at the outlet of the 
service reservoirs. Limited 
correlation was found 
between high levels of 
chlorine and high microbial 
contamination.
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Type of facility   PRIMARY MAINS
1. General information:   Zone:      Area:
2. Code number
3. Date of visit
4. Water samples taken?          Sample No.
Specific diagnostic information for assessment
(Please indicate at which sites the risk was identified)   Risk Sample No.
1. Is there any evidence of leakage? Y/N
2. Is there any evidence of human faeces in vicinity of pipe? Y/N
3. Are there animal faeces in the vicinity of the pipe? Y/N
4. Does the primary main pass through stagnant water? Y/N
5. Is there any evidence of solid waste in the vicinity of the pipe? Y/N
6. Is there any evidence of excessive algal growth in proximity of the pipe?Y/N
7. Is there any evidence of a primary line crossing culvert? Y/N
8. Are there any air valves connected to the standpipe? Y/N
Risk score:  6-8= Very high,  5-7 = High,  3-4 = Medium,  0-3 = Low
Results and recommendations
The following important points of risk were noted: (list Nos: 1-8)
Signature of health inspectors/assistant:
Comments:
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Type of facility   SERVICE RESERVOIR
1. General information:  Zone:      Area:
2. Code number
3. Date of visit:
4. Water samples taken?          Sample No.
Specific diagnostic information for assessment
(Please indicate at which sites the risk was identified)   Risk Sample No.
1. Are vents not covered? (could animals or birds get into the reservoir) Y/N
2. Is the inspection cover or concrete around cover damaged or corroded? Y/N
3. Is the inspection cover not in place when inspected? Y/N
4. Is any observable part of the inside of the tank corroded or damaged? Y/N
 (including ladders, roof struts, walls)
5. Is there evidence of leakage/cracks in the reservoir? Y/N
 (check the outside of the tank to look for faults)
6. Can run-off form stagnant pools close to the reservoir? Y/N
7. Can stagnant or dirty water collect in valve boxes or washout chambers?Y/N
 (i.e. no or blocked washout chamber)
8. Is the reservoir unfenced or insecure? Y/N
9. Is there evidence of faecal material surrounding the valve box? Y/N
10.Has the tank not been cleaned within one month? Y/N
11.Is the valve in the power house leaking? Y/N
Risk score:  10-12 = Very high;  7-9 = High;  4-6 = Medium; 0-3 = Low
Results and recommendations
The following important points of risk were noted: (list Nos: 1-11)
Signature of Inspector:
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Type of facility  BOSTER STATIONS
1. General information:   Zone:      Area:
2. Code number
3. Date of visit
4. Water samples taken?          Sample No.
Specific diagnostic information for assessment
(Please indicate at which sites the risk was identified)   Risk Sample No.
1. Is the bleaching is added to the water in the booster? Y/N
2. Is any observable part of the inside of the booster corroded or damaged?Y/N
 (Including ladders, roof struts, walls)
3. Is there evidence of leakage/cracks in the booster? Y/N
 (Check the inside of the booster to look for faults)
4. Can run-off form stagnant pools close to the booster? Y/N
5. Can stagnant or dirty water collect in valve boxes? Y/N
6. Is the booster unfenced or insecure? Y/N
7. Is there evidence of faecal material surrounding the valve box? Y/N
8. Has the booster not been cleaned within one month? Y/N
9. Is the valve in the powerhouse leaking? Y/N
Risk score:  9-10 = Very high;  6-8 = High;  3-5 = Medium;  0-3 = Low
Results and recommendations
The following important points of risk were noted: (list Nos: 1-9)
Signature of Inspector:
Comments:
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Type of facility  VALVE BOXES
1. General information:   Zone:      Area:
2. Code number
3. Date of visit
4. Water samples taken?          Sample No.
Specific diagnostic information for assessment
(Please indicate at which sites the risk was identified)   Risk Sample No.
1. Is the valve not operational? Y/N
2. Was the cover missing when visited? Y/N
3. Is the valve box cover cracked? Y/N
4. Is the valve corroded? Y/N
5. Does the valve leak? Y/N
6. Is there a lack of backflow preventers installed on supply main? Y/N
7. Is there debris or faecal matter in the valve box? Y/N
8. Is the valve box designed without washout? Y/N
9. Is there stagnant water in valve box? Y/N
10.Are there evident standpipes connected to the valve? Y/N
Risk score:  8-10 = Very high,  6-7 = High,  4-5 = Medium,  0-3 = Low
Results and recommendations
The following important points of risk were noted: (list Nos: 1-10)
Signature of inspectors/assistant:
Comments
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Type of facility  ROADS, DRAINS AND DITCHES
1. General information:   Zone:      Area:
2. Code number
3. Date of visit
4. Water samples taken?          Sample No.
Specific diagnostic information for assessment
(Please indicate at which sites the risk was identified)   Risk Sample No.
1. Is there a valve box within 1m of road crossing? Y/N
2. Is the supply pipe exposed close to the road crossing? Y/N
3. Is there evidence of ingress into the pipe from stagnant water? Y/N
4. Is there evidence of cattle faeces in the area surrounding of the pipe? Y/N
5. Is there evidence of leakage around the pipe? Y/N
6. Does pipe cross open ditch/trench? Y/N
7. Is there evidence of faeces in trench/ditch? Y/N
8. Is there waste material around the pipe? Y/N
9. Is the pipe submerged in stagnant water? Y/N
10.Is the pipe damaged/cracked/leaking/pitted? Y/N
Risk score:  9-10 = Very high;  6-8 = High;  3-5 = Medium;  0-3 = Low
Results and recommendations
The following important points of risk were noted: (list Nos. 1-10)
Signature of Health Inspector/Assistant:
Comments:
105
PLANNING WATER SAFETY MANAGEMENT
Type of facility  STANDPIPES/HOUSE CONNECTIONS
1. General information:   Zone:      Area:
2. Code number
3. Date of visit
4. Water samples taken?          Sample No.
Specific diagnostic information for assessment
(Please indicate at which sites the risk was identified)   Risk Sample No.
1. Do any standpipes leak? Y/N
2. Does surface water collect around any standpipe? Y/N
3. Is animal faeces in the vicinity of the standpipe? Y/N
4. Are pipes exposed close to any tap stand? Y/N
5. Is hman excreta on the ground within 10m of any standpipe? Y/N
6. Is the main pipe submerged in stagnant water? Y/N
7. Are there solid waste dumps 10m from tap stands? Y/N
8. Are there stagnant pools of water close to the pipe? Y/N
9. Does the main pipe pass through sewage/pit latrines/septic tank 
 foul water bodies? Y/N
10.Does main pipe cross a drain/ditch? (if YES go to road crossing SI) Y/N
Risk score:  8-10 = Very high,  5-7 = High,  3-4 = Medium,  0-3 = Low
Results and recommendations
The following important points of risk were noted:  (list Nos: 1-10)
Signature of health inspectors/assistant:
Comments:
106
WATER SAFETY PLANS: BOOK 1
Type of facility  TREATMENT PROCESSES
1. General information:   Zone:      Area:
2. Code number
3. Date of visit
4. Water samples taken?          Sample No.
Specific diagnostic information for assessment
(Please indicate at which sites the risk was identified)   Risk Sample No.
1. Are there evident cracks in the pre filters? Y/N
2. Are there leaks in the mixing tank? Y/N
3. Is the mixing tank in an unsanitary condition? Y/N
4. Are there evident hydraulic surges in intake? Y/N
5. Is sedimentation tank in an unsanitary condition? Y/N
6. Is the air and water supply distribution in the sand bed unesen? Y/N
7. Are there mud balls or cracks in the filters? Y/N
8. Are there evident cross connections between backwashed and 
 treated water? Y/N
9. Is there evidence of insufficient alum dosing? Y/N
10.Are insufficient Cl2 RCL levels not being achieved? Y/N
Risk score:  8-10 = Very high;  6-7 = High;  3-5 = Medium;  0-3 = Low
Results and recommendations
The following important points of risk were noted: (list Nos. 1-10)
Signature of Health Inspector/Assistant:
Comments:
